The Dirty Dozen Twelve Failures of the Hurricane Katrina Response and How Psychology Can Help Anahita Gheytanchi, Lisa Joseph, Elaine Gierlach, Satoko Kimpara, Jennifer Housley, Zeno E. Franco, and Larry E. Beutler Pacific Graduate School of Psychology This comprehensive analysis addresses the United States��� alarming lack of preparedness to respond effectively to a massive disaster as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina. First, a timeline of problematic response events during and after Hurricane Katrina orients readers to some of the specific problems encountered at different levels of government. Second, a list of the ���Dirty Dozen������12 major failures that have occurred in prior disasters, which also contributed to inadequate response during and after Hurricane Katrina��� is presented. Third, this article encourages expanding psy- chology���s role beyond the treatment of trauma to encom- pass disaster planning and mitigation efforts from a broader public health perspective. Finally, areas for im- portant interdisciplinary research in human behavior that will influence our nation���s overall preparedness for future catastrophes are identified, and ways psychologists can become personally involved beyond treating casualties are discussed. Keywords: Hurricane Katrina, response preparedness, les- sons learned, disaster and role of psychology We���ve got runners running from commander to commander. In other words, we���re going to the sound of gunfire, as we used to say in the Revolutionary War. ���Major General Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi National Guard1 Tdisaster he 2005 hurricane season served to demonstrate the grievous shortcomings of the federal, state, and local response efforts in the United States. De- spite the wake-up call provided by 9/11, response agencies at each of these levels were taken by surprise and were unprepared to respond effectively to a mass disaster. The response failures following Hurricane Katrina point to a variety of systemic problems. In particular, the issue of coordinated state and local government integration with the U.S. military continues to prove particularly difficult. Lack of effective disaster management becomes magnified when coalitions made up of civil and military authorities form decoupled command structures, often amplifying coordina- tion and communication difficulties rather than improving them (Drabek, 2003). One of the pressing questions our nation faces is how to optimize disaster response and maintain readiness for all-hazards events. Despite tremendous investments of time and money, these goals remain elusive. In fact, according to some accounts, our nation���s ability to adequately re- spond to catastrophic events has declined since the early part of the last century (Winchester, 2005). For example, in the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake, which oc- curred at 5:12 a.m. on April 18, 1906, it took just 153 minutes for federal troops to be marched into the city and put at the mayor���s disposal. By 4:00 a.m. on the morning of April 19th���less than 24 hours after the earthquake oc- curred���William Taft, then Secretary of War, ordered hos- pital trains sent to California (Winchester, 2005). Using what would be by today���s standards the most minimal of communication technology, a rapid, national response was initiated through a few terse telegraph messages. In this article, we attempt to accomplish three tasks. First, we offer a timeline of events that occurred during and after the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Second, we present and discuss a list of 12 key failures that are common to all catastrophic disasters, including Hurricane Katrina. Fi- nally, we argue that the behavioral sciences���and psychol- ogy in particular���are fundamentally linked to improving Anahita Gheytanchi, Lisa Joseph, Elaine Gierlach, Satoko Kimpara, Jen- nifer Housley, Zeno E. Franco, and Larry E. Beutler, Pacific Graduate School of Psychology. Zeno E. Franco is on appointment as a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fellow under the DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Program, which is administered by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) for DHS through an interagency agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Oak Ridge Associated Universities��� ORISE is managed by DOE Contract No. DE-AC05���000R22750. All of the opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies and views of DHS, DOE, or ORISE. We thank Kathryn Yanick for managing the large number of news reports used to develop and cross-check the timelines of the Hurricane Katrina response. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Larry E. Beutler, Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, 935 East Meadow Drive, Palo Alto, CA 94303. E-mail: lbeutler@pgsp.edu 1 U.S. House of Representatives (2006, p. 174). 118 February���March 2007 ��� American Psychologist Copyright 2007 by the American Psychological Association 0003-066X/07/$12.00 Vol. 62, No. 2, 118���130 DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.62.2.118

disaster management across all phases of these events, not just in their immediate aftermath (Jacobs, 1995). The Unfolding of Events in Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Katrina, named on Thursday, August 25, 2005, as it formed in the Bahamas, was seen as a major threat soon after becoming a Category 3 storm (Ripley, 2005). At the urging of the Federal Emergency Management Admin- istration (FEMA), on the same day, the President declared an emergency in the state of Louisiana, allowing water, food, and ice to be stockpiled at military bases around the state. The system appeared to be working. Two days after Katrina formed, the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge announced the ultimate fear: that the city of New Orleans might flood. On Sunday, August 28th, Mayor C. Ray Nagin recommended evacuation after the storm be- came a Category 5 Hurricane. The evacuation order was not mandatory. Freeways were jammed as those with the ability to leave obeyed, but tens of thousands did not because of financial constraints, lack of transportation op- tions, concerns for pets and livestock, or because they had been able to ride out prior storms (���Timeline: How the Hurricane,��� 2005). The first 72 hours after a disaster are deemed to be the most important period during which to assert order. How- ever, in New Orleans, hesitation to coordinate effectively started locally and infected the chain of command all the way to Washington, DC. There was ambiguity as to who was in charge, goods were not utilized, and police seemed unwilling to work in the chaotic city (���FEMA in Chaos,��� 2005 Ripley, 2005 Thompson, 2005). Figures 1 and 2 depict timelines of key events, re- sponses, and results at city, state, and federal levels of response. Taken together, these timelines clearly illustrate where the communication and coordination failures oc- curred. Despite billions of dollars spent following 9/11 to improve emergency coordination, the response to Hurri- cane Katrina utterly failed. An understanding of the behav- ioral aspects of both disaster management personnel and the civilians impacted by catastrophes is essential to im- proving response performance. Psychologists must begin to conceptualize their contribution to disaster response be- yond just treating acute stress reactions in victims, instead expanding their view to include the treatment of an entire policy, planning, and response system that appears to be badly broken. The Dirty Dozen: Twelve Key Failures 1. Lack of Efficient Communication One of the main shortcomings in the response efforts was the lack of timely, effective communication between and within state and federal agencies. The transmission of accurate information about the impact of the disaster up the command chain, the transmission of data about decisions and the location of assets down the chain of command, and the sharing of knowledge horizontally in peer-to-peer rela- tionships are critical to forming shared situational aware- ness (Beaubien, Baker, & Holtzman, 2003 Endsley, 2000). Most other disaster management tasks, such as decision making and coordination, are predicated on effective com- munication. However, more communication does not nec- essarily mean better communication (Ha ��rtel & Ha��rtel, 1997). Despite a well-established command and control pro- tocol and the introduction of the new National Response Plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004), at least four separate command structures were operating in Katrina���s aftermath (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). Two command structures were present within FEMA, pro- foundly clouding the operational picture for the duration of the recovery effort. Two distinct military commands were also established���the Louisiana National Guard and the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which never came under joint control. This prevented adequate peer-to- peer communication between military commanders and resulted in several duplicated planning and execution tasks. Further, NORTHCOM efforts remained outside of the FEMA command structure for the duration of the incident (for a more detailed discussion of communication issues, see U.S. House of Representatives, 2006 Knauer, 2005). A key communication error occurred when a FEMA forward observer surveyed the levee breaches from the air on the afternoon of August 29th and the White House was not informed of the breach because the Department of Homeland Security���s Operational Center viewed this as an unconfirmed eyewitness report. Thus, the White House did not have confirmation of levee failure until early Tuesday, August 30th���some eight hours later. Had the observer���s assessment been taken at face value or deconflicted expe- Anahita Gheytanchi 119 February���March 2007 ��� American Psychologist