Exceptions that prove the rule--Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and political anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003).

  • T J
  • Jack G
  • W K
  • et al.
ISSN: 1939-1455
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Abstract

A meta-analysis by J. T. Jost, J. Glaser, A. W. Kruglanski, and F. J. Sulloway (2003) concluded that political conservatism is partially motivated by the management of uncertainty and threat. In this reply to J. Greenberg and E. Jonas (2003), conceptual issues are clarified, numerous political anomalies are explained, and alleged counterexamples are incorporated with a dynamic model that takes into account differences between "young" and "old" movements. Studies directly pitting the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis against the ideological extremity hypothesis demonstrate strong support for the former. Medium to large effect sizes describe relations between political conservatism and dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity; lack of openness to experience; uncertainty avoidance; personal needs for order, structure, and closure; fear of death; and system threat. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (journal abstract)

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T, J. J., Jack, G., W, K. A., & J, S. F. (2003). Exceptions that prove the rule--Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and political anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003). Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 383–393. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2003-00782-005&site=ehost-live&scope=site jost_john@gsb.stanford.edu

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