Yudkowsky's "coherent extrapolated volition" (CEV) concept shares much in common Ideal Advisor theories in moral philosophy. Does CEV fall prey to the same objections which are raised against Ideal Advisor theories? Because CEV is an epistemic rather than a metaphysical proposal, it seems that at least one family of CEV approaches (inspired by Bostrom's parliamentary model) may escape the objections raised against Ideal Advisor theories. This is not a particularly ambitious post; it mostly aims to place CEV in the context of mainstream moral philosophy.
CITATION STYLE
Muehlhauser, L., & Crazy88. (2012). Ideal Advisor Theories and Personal CEV. Less Wrong (Blog). Retrieved from http://lesswrong.com/lw/g35/ideal_advisor_theories_and_personal_cev/
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