We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2-person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games, also known as potential games. Lastly, mixed equilibria of partnership games are shown to be always unstable under all dynamics of this class. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
CITATION STYLE
Hofbauer, J., & Hopkins, E. (2005). Learning in perturbed asymmetric games. Games and Economic Behavior, 52(1), 133–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.006
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