The Logic of Conditionals

Abstract

The Logic of Conditionals In his monograph The Paradoxes of Classical Logic (Paradoxy klasickéj logiky. Filosofie a logika hypotetických vět), Vít Punčochář, in addition to an overview of classical log-ic, presents the paradoxes of material implication and an explanation of the primary alternative ways to solve them, especially in the form of an exposition of his own ver-sion of the theory of strict assertibility. The theory is presented in a sufficiently com-prehensive form on a base of detailed argumentation. In the critical part of this article, the author lays out the ideas that form the ba-sis of his own solution to the main paradoxes of material implication, which is still based on the concept of truth. At the same time, it uses the distinction between the actual and the potentially unreal, or if you like the absolutely unrealistic conditions of implicit sentences and the corresponding classification of conditional sentences into factuals, agnostic conditionals and counterfactuals. The author additionally suggests differentiating between situations in which the analysis of conditional sentences as material implications has precedence over those in which it is an expression of infer-ence. In the latter case, it is an expression of the abbreviations of judgments, where tacit assumptions and the principle of ceteris paribus can come into play.