PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Research Article MORALIZATION AND BECOMING A VEGETARIAN: The Transformation of Preferences Into Values and the Recruitment of Disgust Paul Rozin, Maureen Markwith, and Caryn Stoess University of Pennsylvania Abstract���We describe a rather common process that we call mor- alization, in which objects or activities that were previously morally neutral acquire a moral component. Moralization converts prefer- ences into values, and in doing so influences cross-generational trans- mission (because values are passed more effectively in families than are preferences), increases the likelihood of intemalization, invokes greater emotional response, and mobilizes the support of governmen- tal and other cultural institutions. In recent decades, we claim, ciga- rette smoking in America has become moralized. We support our claims about some of the consequences of moralization with an analy- sis of differences between health and moral vegetarians. Compared with health vegetarians, moral vegetarians find meat more disgusting, offer more reasons in support of their meat avoidance, and avoid a wider range of animal foods. However, contrary to our prediction, liking for meat is about the same in moral and health vegetarians. In this article, we identify a process that we call moralization. This process works at both the individual and cultural levels, and involves the acquisition of moral qualities by objects or activities that previ- ously were morally neutral. We believe that moralization is common, at both the cultural and the individual levels, and that it has signifi- cance for understanding norms, socialization, and, particularly, health-related behaviors and attitudes on health issues. The signifi- cance of moralization is that it converts preferences into values. Val- ues are more durable than preferences, more central to the self, and more internalized (McCauley, Rozin, & Schwartz, 1995), We there- fore suggest that values are more likely to promote cognitive consis- tency, and hence the accrual of multiple justifications for the relevant action or avoidance. Two other critical differences between values and preferences are that values, unlike preferences, are subject to institu- tional and legal support and that values are much more likely than preferences to be transmitted in the family environment, via sociali- zation-intemalization (Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen, & Dombusch, 1982 Rozin, 1991), Changes in attitudes to slavery are an example of moralization in American history. The clearest example on the current scene in the United States is the conversion of cigarette smoking from a personal preference into an immoral activity. The passive-smoking/sidestream- smoke debate has made a case that cigarette smoking harms other people, a clearly immoral act. As a consequence of moral aspects, governments and corporations have been enabled to discourage or prohibit smoking. Individuals feel entitled to censure smokers and seem more annoyed by the eye irritation caused by smoke in the air, and perhaps more disgusted by the ash and cigarette butt residues of smoking. There is, of course, a corresponding process that we can call amor- Address correspondence to Paul Rozin, Department of Psychology, Uni- versity of Pennsylvania, 3815 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196. alization in which values become preferences. One can see such ef- fects in progress in American society with respect to divorce or smok- ing of marijuana. Both preferences and values link into affective systems. However, the linkage of values is of particular interest and potency because values (or their violations) tend to invoke strong moral emotions, such as anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, and shame. We have paid particular attention to the emotion of disgust as a means through which strong aversions and rejections can be established (Rozin & Fallon, 1987 Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993). We have argued that disgust orig- inated as a specific type of ideational food rejection, but that, through cultural evolution, disgust is "applied" to a wide variety of objects and events, as a means of supporting and internalizing avoidance of these objects and events. Thus, disgust, sometimes in a moral or quasi-moral framework, is invoked in response to body products (via toilet training), contact with death, inappropriate sex, and certain clearly immoral offenses such as gory crimes or familial violence (Rozin et al., 1993 Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). Moral values are often referred to as internalized, that is, as a part of the self for example, cigarette smoking is a much more significant personal feature now than it was a generation ago. We predict that the moral linkage encourages the occurrence of a hedonic shift: An object or activity that is aligned with one's moral views is more likely to become liked, and one that is in violation of such views is more likely to become disliked (McCauley et al., 1995). Our aim in this article is to introduce and describe moralization (see also Rozin, in press), and to provide evidence for some of its consequences in the domain of vegetarianism. We do not propose to shed light on the mechanisms of moralization in this first article on moralization. However, our interviews and observations (see also Amato & Partridge, 1989) suggest that strong affective experiences, such as seeing animals slaughtered for purposes of consumption, or losing a relative to lung cancer, can have powerful effects in promot- ing moralization. More cognitive routes, such as reading a book about animal rights, or examining public-health statistics on smoking, can also promote moralization. An initial effort to identify factors that may promote moralization (Rozin, in press) indicates, for example, that Protestantism may provide a favorable environment for moral- ization. Also, the likelihood of moralization seems to increase if the offending activity causes harm to children, or is practiced primarily by an already stigmatized minority. Denial of rights or opportunities is the central focus of the Ameri- can (and other Western) moral system. Hence, the portrayal of ciga- rette smoking as harming people other than the smoker (belief in harmful effects of sidestream smoke) or belief that animals have rights provides an intellectual basis for considering cigarette smoking or meat eating immoral. In other cultures, such as Hindu India, the domain of morality is broader and different (Shweder, Much, Ma- hapatra, & Park, in press), and hence the domain of moralization is VOL. 8, NO. 2, MARCH 1997 Copyright �� 1997 American Psychological Society 67

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Moralization greater. In particular, we believe that the emotion of disgust is linked to purity violations, which are distinctly more moral in quality in Hindu India than in the United States (Shweder et al, in press Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1996). Once moralization has begun, it often moves ahead with the force that a moral justification can motivate. Avoidance of red meat often proceeds to avoidance of other foods of animal origin, and the degree of moral commitment tends to increase (Amato & Partridge, 1989). In accord with the well-established human motive of cognitive consis- tency, people try to resolve apparent contradictions in their attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, when people take a strong and irrevoca- ble position, they tend to selectively seek and process information in such a way as to reinforce this position (Frey, 1986). Although a liking for A (e.g., eggplant) and not B (e.g., olives) is unlikely to stimulate cognitive work or selectivity, a moral position is quite likely to. For these reasons, long-standing moral vegetarians may be ex- pected to offer more reasons for their meat avoidance than health vegetarians, or moral vegetarians of more recent origin. In this article, we examine moralization and the involvement of disgust in the emergence of vegetarianism in Americans. Vegetarian- ism is a substantial movement in the United States, including about 9 million Americans according to a Gallup Poll in 1985 (Amato & Partridge, 1989). Some vegetarians invoke only moral reasons for becoming vegetarian, or for currently avoiding meat, and others in- voke only health reasons (Amato & Partridge, 1989, and unpublished data from the present study). Our principal aim in the remainder of this article is to explore the differences between moral and health vegetarians in order to shed light on the course and consequences of moralization. Moral vegetarians attach an "ought" to avoiding meat, show some concem that other people eat meat, and perhaps are less tempted by (attracted to) meat. Health vegetarians are less inclined to use the word "ought," are less disturbed that others consume meat, and perhaps are more often tempted to consume meat. Compliant vegetarians (i.e., people who avoid meat for health reasons) believe they derive health benefits from meat avoidance, but are tempted by the aroma of meat, and are fighting the tendency to eat it. Under stress (strong hunger or problems in their lives), they are likely to succumb, and they may be looking for infonnation that will absolve meat of its supposed health-damaging properties. Moral veg- etarians, in contrast, have the strong force of morality behind them. One of the most interesting aspects of the process of becoming a vegetarian involves the hedonic shift that often accompanies it meat changes from a liked to a disliked or even disgusting entity. This shift may be considered an example of intemalization of preference, in that the avoidance of meat becomes motivated by a dislike for the sensory or other inherent properties of the entity itself. Amato and Partridge (1989) reported that only 12% of their subjects offered dislike or repulsiveness of meat as a cause for becoming a vegetarian. Rather, affective responses and affective change seem to be more frequently a consequence of becoming a vegetarian. Amato and Partridge (1989) reported that 48% of their vegetarian subjects experienced cravings for meat, and that this was as likely for health as for moral vegetar- ians. They also reported that these cravings typically fade over time: After a period of time, even former meat lovers come to fmd the sight, and particularly the smell, of meat to be nauseating, (p. 92) 82% of vegetarians say there is no way they would consider eating flesh again. Feelings of disgust at the very thought of eating meat are prominent in most people's response. To many, the idea is simply unthinkable, (p. 92) Our aim is to explore the conditions that bring about this change. Although Amato and Partridge suggested that moral motivations are not a factor, we have a principled reason for believing that they are, and test some related propositions in this article. Better understanding of the conditions under which meat becomes disgusting or the hedonic quality of its sensory attributes changes might provide insight into the general process of hedonic shift. In the subsequent empirical part of this study, we explore the following issues: ��� Is there a greater accretion of motives with time for moral as opposed to health vegetarians? Similarly, is the range of animal foods rejected greater in moral vegetarians? ��� Is there a tendency for disgust toward meat to be associated with moral as opposed to health motivations to vegetarianism? ��� Is the increased dislike of meat (negative reactions to the taste, smell, texture, or appearance) more likely to occur in moral than in health vegetarians? METHOD Subjects Data in the form of a completed questionnaire were collected from 119 subjects in 1987, All 119 subjects identified themselves as at least reluctant to eat meat. The 15 kosher Jews in this sample were elimi- nated from the analysis on the grounds that they were the only group of subjects with religious reasons for meat avoidance. The analyses reported here were done on the remaining 104 subjects, of which 34 were male and 69 were female (sex of 1 subject was unreported). The mean age was 26.6 {SD = 8.95) principal races represented were white (n = 85) and Asian (n = 9). Responses to a question on religious affiliation indicated that 41 subjects were agnostic, 19 Jew- ish, 11 Catholic, 11 Protestant, and 20 "other." Questionnaires were mailed to subjects who responded to adver- tisements posted on the University of Pennsylvania campus. The advertisements solicited interest in a survey from "meat avoiders, vegetarians, and people reluctant to eat meat." Included with each questionnaire was a stamped envelope addressed to the experimenters, along with one dollar. In addition, a sign advertising the study was posted in a natural-food store in the university community, and inter- ested customers were given a copy of the questionnaire (with a stamped envelope and one dollar) by the cashier. Questionnaire The questionnaire was designed in accordance with the guidelines offered by Dillman (1978), The cover page of the questionnaire began as follows: "ATTITUDES TO MEAT: Why are many people reluc- tant to eat animal products? A questionnaire for people who avoid or are reluctant to eat some kinds of meat." This introduction was followed by a paragraph explaining our interest in this area. The questionnaire itself had five parts. 1. An open-ended set of questions directed at how, when, and why the subject came to avoid meat. 2. Ratings of current attitudes ("readily eat," "reluctantly eat," 68 VOL. 8, NO. 2, MARCH 1997