How (Not) to Relate Cognitive Externalism and Rule-Following
Miller (2004) has recently argued for the following two claims: (1) McDowell (1992a), in the context of discussing Putnam’s (1975) Twin-Earth argument, derives a particular form of cognitive external- ism from his favored solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s “skeptical paradox” about rule-following, and (2) McDowell’s derivation fails. In this paper, I argue for the following two points. First, though Miller’s. Second, McDowell does argue for some form of cognitive externalism when discussing Putnam, but his argument consists in merely pointing out a possibility of drawing the conclusion of the Twin-Earth argument that Putnam fails to see, and in diagnosing why Putnam fails to see it. My analysis of why Miller makes the attributive error is that he has not sufficiently appreciated the quietist methodology which McDowell widely and persistently adopts in dealing with philosophical problems. This paper concludes with a suggestion of how we should not relate rule-following and cognitive externalism.