Abstract
Many programs operate reactively - patiently waiting for user input, running for a while producing output, and eventually returning to a state where they are ready to accept another input (or occasionally diverging). When a reactive program communicates with multiple parties, we would like to be sure that it can be given secret information by one without leaking it to others. Motivated by web browsers and client-side web applications, we explore definitions of noninterference for reactive programs and identify two of special interest - one corresponding to termination-insensitive noninterference for a simple sequential language, the other to termination-sensitive noninterference. We focus on the former and develop a proof technique for showing that program behaviors are secure according to this definition. To demonstrate the viability of the approach, we define a simple reactive language with an information-flow type system and apply our proof technique to show that well-typed programs are secure. Copyright 2009 ACM.
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CITATION STYLE
Bohannon, A., Pierce, B. C., Sjöberg, V., Weirich, S., & Zdancewic, S. (2009). Reactive noninterference. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 79–90). https://doi.org/10.1145/1653662.1653673
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