96 Personality and Social Psychology Review 14(1) In the remainder of this article, we elaborate the theoreti- cal underpinnings of the implicit self-regulation model of religiosity and evaluate relevant empirical evidence. We begin by discussing classic and modern theories of the unconscious in religious behavior, which have generally depicted the unc- onscious as a primitive cognitive system. Subsequently, we turn to modern theories of the adaptive unconscious and dis- cuss recent notions of implicit self-regulation processes. Next, we consider the rationale for assuming that many forms of religion facilitate implicit self-regulation. We then use the implicit self-regulation model to organize existing evidence on the interface between religiosity and self-regulation. Finally, we summarize our main conclusions and suggest directions for future research. Theories of the Unconscious In his classic Varieties of Religious Experience, William James (1902/2002) ventured that the unconscious might be ���the fountainhead of much that feeds our religion��� (p. 374). These speculations were severely criticized by James���s contempo- raries, who argued that invoking the unconscious to account for religious experience ���represents an attempt to explain the obscure by the almost totally dark��� (Moore, 1938, pp. 199, 201 also see Wulff, 1997). Nevertheless, the significance of the unconscious in religious behavior was resumed by theo- rists from various psychoanalytic, depth-psychological, and behaviorist traditions (Freud, 1927/1989 Jung, 1938/1969 Vetter, 1958). The aforementioned traditions have offered very different theoretical characterizations of the unconscious processes that might underlie religion. Nevertheless, they agree in their conception of the unconscious as an inherently crude and primitive system. A notable exception is the work by existen- tial therapist Victor Frankl (1948/1975). Frankl proposed that all humans possess an unconscious form of spirituality, which he also referred to as ���conscience��� or a ���pre-reflective ontological self-understanding��� (p. 127). According to Frankl, this unconscious spirituality is grounded in highly personalize feelings and intuitions. Moreover, Frankl surmised that these intuitions are intelligent by being ���more sensitive than reason can ever be sensible��� (p. 39). Frankl���s (1948/1975) ideas about cognitively sophisticated unconscious processes foreshadowed modern research, which has shown that the unconscious regulates far more than instinc- tive or routine behavior. Rather, unconscious processes are integral to intelligent goal-directed actions that are performed in close interaction with dynamically changing environmen- tal contingencies (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000 E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004 Kuhl, 2000). The unconscious may accomplish this through parallel-distributed processing (PDP McClelland, Rumelhart, & PDP Research Group, 1986 also see Kuhl, 2000). PDP is capable of integrating vast amounts of informa- tion about internal constraints (i.e., needs, goals, motives) and external constraints (i.e., situational demands, contextual infor- mation). The parallel and integrative nature of this type of cognitive processing renders it inaccessible to introspection. Nevertheless, people may have some conscious access to the resulting cognitive products in the form of hunches, intu- itions, or feelings (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). In recent years, notions of the adaptive unconscious have begun to find their way into theories of human self-regulation (Kuhl, 2000 Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004 Shah, 2005). This work seems highly relevant to the psychology of reli- gion given that theorists have long assumed a close link between religion and the healthy functioning of the self (Frankl, 1948/1975 Fromm, 1950 Jung, 1938/1969 Maslow, 1964 May, 1953). Implicit and Explicit Modes of Self-Regulation Within modern psychology, self-regulation is traditionally assumed to function like an ���inner dictatorship��� (Kuhl, 2000) that is conscious, effortful, and repressive toward automatic tendencies (Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007). How- ever, people may also go about the self-regulation process in a more flexible manner. Indeed, some forms of self-regulation appear to operate more like an ���inner democracy��� (Kuhl, 2000) by regulating people���s actions in harmony with the totality of people���s inner needs, motives, and autobiographi- cal experiences. This implicit mode of self-regulation is not mediated by explicit intentions but rather by integrated feel- ings or intuitions about appropriate courses of action (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). We conceive of implicit self-regulation as a process in which a central executive (i.e., the implicit self) coordinates the person���s functioning by integrating as many subsystems and processes as possible for supporting a chosen course of action. The functional architecture for implicit self-regulation is provided by a parallel-processing system of extended (holistic) memory representations (extension memory Kuhl, 2000) that are closely connected with the autonomic nervous system. Implicit self-regulation is likely to be especially advantageous when people have to deal with challenging conditions, such as high social demands (Jostmann & Koole, in press) or inner conflict (Koole, Govorun, Chang, & Gallucci, in press). Under such circumstances, implicit self-regulation can mobilize a wide variety of psychological resources that allow people to function flexibly and efficiently, such as implicit self-esteem (Koole, 2004), self-serving attributions (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985), positive affect (Koole & Jostmann, 2004), intuitions (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002), implicit motives (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005), automatic interpretive biases (Koole & van den Berg, 2005), affirmation of symbolic worl dviews (Kaz��n, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2005), and increases in working memory capacity (Jostmann & Koole, 2006). Implicit self-regulation should further be useful in situations at UNIV OF CONNECTICUT on May 5, 2010 http://psr.sagepub.com Downloaded from

Koole et al. 97 that are better grasped intuitively rather than analytically, such as multitasking environments (Jostmann & Koole, in press), emotional conflicts (Koole, 2009a), and existential problems (Koole & van den Berg, 2005). Empirical evidence supports the importance of implicit self-regulation in many domains. For instance, subliminally priming self-related stimuli can lead to increased self-regulation of reflexive responses (Koole & Coenen, 2007 Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998). Likewise, priming individu- als with autonomy-related stimuli can promote more intrinsic self-regulation, as evidenced by more voluntary task engage- ment, reduced self-serving bias, and increased psychological well-being (for a review, see Levesque, Copeland, & Sutcliffe, 2008). Other research has shown that self-regula- tory processes can modulate implicit processes, for instance, leading people to actively respond to stimuli results in ���unpriming,��� that is, spontaneous deactivation of the primed contents (Fiedler, Bluemke, Unkelbach, in press Martin, 1986 Sedikides, 1990 Sparrow & Wegner, 2006). Relatedly, research has supported the existence of implicit counterregu- lation processes, which rapidly and flexibly undo the impact of previously activated motivational and emotional states (Fishbach & Trope, 2007 Koole & Jostmann, 2004 Rother- mund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008 also see Koole, 2009a). The functional independence of implicit and explicit self- regulation is corroborated by findings that the two kinds of self-regulation can mutually interfere with another. For ins- tance, an emphasis on explicit goals may disrupt a person���s cognitive access to implicitly represented needs, leading to motivational conflict and overall reductions in psychological well-being (Baumann et al., 2005). Conversely, an emphasis on the person���s extended values can lead people to disengage from a specific goal at an appropriate time, for instance, when this goal was repeatedly frustrated (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). The single-minded focus of explicit self-regulation is pre- sumably hard to combine with the more holistic, person-oriented focus of implicit self-regulation. Indeed, implicit and explicit self-regulation are associated with antagonistic cognitive styles (Kuhl, 2000). Explicit self-regulation is closely associated with analytic processing, a cognitive style that is dependent on lin- guistic encoding, precise, sequential, rigid, and dissociated from emotional and sensorimotor systems. By contrast, implicit self- regulation is closely associated with integrative processing, a cognitive style that is largely independent of linguistic enc- oding, impressionistic, parallel, flexibly attuned to multiple meanings, and closely coupled with emotional and sensorimo- tor systems. A large volume of research supports the distinction between analytic versus integrative processing styles (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002 Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007 F��rster, in press). Because of its holistic focus, implicit self-regulation is optimally suited to maintain the global integrity of the per- sonality system (Kuhl, 2000). This global adaptive function operates in at least three distinct ways. First, implicit self- regulation has been shown to promote volitional efficiency, such that the individual is capable of forming appropriate intentions and translating these into action (Kuhl, 1985, 2000 for a review, see Jostmann & Koole, in press). Second, implicit self-regulation has been shown to promote flexible and efficient affect regulation, such that the individual can avoid becoming overwhelmed or stuck in emotional or moti- vational states (for a review, see Koole, 2009a). Third, implicit self-regulation has been shown to promote an implicit sense of meaning in life, such that the individual is capable of creating meaning out of new experiences and maintaining older networks of meaningful cognitive repre- sentations (for a review, see Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Religiosity and Implicit Self-Regulation The central proposal of the present article is that religiosity may facilitate implicit self-regulation. This proposal is based on the notion that a great deal of religious practices and beli- efs are likely to draw on similar psychological processes as implicit self-regulation. Because of this overlap, religiosity may promote the acquisition of skills that are conducive to implicit self-regulation. In addition, engaging in religious practices or exposure to religious stimuli may activate cogni- tive procedures, motivational and emotional states, and other psychological mechanisms that increase people���s readiness to engage in implicit self-regulation. Following Atran and Norenzayan (2004), we conceive of religion as a broad cultural syndrome that is characterized by deeply held beliefs in supernatural agents such as gods or spirits, along with ritualized and socially shared practices that sustain these beliefs. There are considerable individual and cultural differences in religious commitments, beliefs, and practices. Nevertheless, core aspects of religion can be found across virtually all human cultures and among the majority of individuals around the world today. As we show, at least some of these core aspects of religion appear to be highly compatible with implicit self-regulation. A first way in which religion and implicit self-regulation are compatible is that both are oriented toward the whole person. Religion seeks to transform every aspect of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of the person. Indeed, practicing reli- gious principles in a part-time or compartmentalized manner violates the basic principles of most religions. The holistic nature of religion points to a focus on the well-being of the entire person. To be sure, the well-being of the person is rarely the explicit focus of religion. Indeed, most religious traditions emphasize ideals that transcend the individual person, such as ���living according to the will of God.��� How- ever, not explicitly stating the person-oriented function of religion may paradoxically facilitate the operation of implicit self-regulation processes. This is because explicit goals are likely to trigger explicit self-regulation, which can easily at UNIV OF CONNECTICUT on May 5, 2010 http://psr.sagepub.com Downloaded from