THE SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST AND WHY? A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress September 1999 Author: Rex A. Hudson Editor: Marilyn Majeska Project Managers: Andrea M. Savada Helen C. Metz Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540���4840 Tel: 202���707���3900 Fax: 202���707���3920 E-Mail: frds@loc.gov Homepage: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/

Dear Reader: This product was prepared by the staff of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the sponsoring United States Government agency. The Federal Research Division is the Library of Congress's primary fee-for-service research unit and has served United States Government agencies since 1948. At the request of Executive and Judicial branch agencies, and on a cost-recovery basis, the Division prepares customized studies and reports, chronologies, bibliographies, foreign-language abstracts, databases, and other directed-research products in hard- copy and electronic media. The research includes a broad spectrum of social sciences, physical sciences, and humanities topics using the collections of the Library of Congress and other information sources world-wide. For additional information on obtaining the research and analytical services of the Federal Research Division, please call 202���707���3909, fax 202���707���3920), via E-mail frds@loc.gov, or write to: Marketing Coordinator, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 20540���4840. The Division's World Wide Web Homepage can be viewed at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd. Robert L. Worden, Ph.D. Chief Federal Research Division Library of Congress 101 Independence Ave SE Washington, DC 20540���4840 E-mail: rwor@loc.gov

i PREFACE The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the types of individuals and groups that are prone to terrorism (see Glossary) in an effort to help improve U.S. counterterrorist methods and policies. The emergence of amorphous and largely unknown terrorist individuals and groups operating independently (freelancers) and the new recruitment patterns of some groups, such as recruiting suicide commandos, female and child terrorists, and scientists capable of developing weapons of mass destruction, provide a measure of urgency to increasing our understanding of the psychological and sociological dynamics of terrorist groups and individuals. The approach used in this study is twofold. First, the study examines the relevant literature and assesses the current knowledge of the subject. Second, the study seeks to develop psychological and sociological profiles of foreign terrorist individuals and selected groups to use as case studies in assessing trends, motivations, likely behavior, and actions that might deter such behavior, as well as reveal vulnerabilities that would aid in combating terrorist groups and individuals. Because this survey is concerned not only with assessing the extensive literature on sociopsychological aspects of terrorism but also providing case studies of about a dozen terrorist groups, it is limited by time constraints and data availability in the amount of attention that it can give to the individual groups, let alone individual leaders or other members. Thus, analysis of the groups and leaders will necessarily be incomplete. A longer study, for example, would allow for the collection and study of the literature produced by each group in the form of autobiographies of former members, group communiqu��s and manifestos, news media interviews, and other resources. Much information about the terrorist mindset (see Glossary) and decision-making process can be gleaned from such sources. Moreover, there is a language barrier to an examination of the untranslated literature of most of the groups included as case studies herein. Terrorism databases that profile groups and leaders quickly become outdated, and this report is no exception to that rule. In order to remain current, a terrorism database ideally should be updated periodically. New groups or terrorist leaders may suddenly emerge, and if an established group perpetrates a major terrorist incident, new information on the group is likely to be reported in news media. Even if a group appears to be quiescent, new information may become available about the group from scholarly publications.

ii There are many variations in the transliteration for both Arabic and Persian. The academic versions tend to be more complex than the popular forms used in the news media and by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Thus, the latter usages are used in this study. For example, although Ussamah bin Ladin is the proper transliteration, the more commonly used Osama bin Laden is used in this study.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: MINDSETS OF MASS DESTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 New Types of Post-Cold War Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 New Forms of Terrorist-Threat Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 TERMS OF ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Defining Terrorism and Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Terrorist Group Typologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 APPROACHES TO TERRORISM ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Multicausal Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Political Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Organizational Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 The Physiological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Psychological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 GENERAL HYPOTHESES OF TERRORISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Negative Identity Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Narcissistic Rage Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TERRORIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Terrorist Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Process of Joining a Terrorist Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The Terrorist as Mentally Ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 The Terrorist as Suicidal Fanatic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Fanatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Suicide Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Terrorist Group Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Pressures to Conform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Pressures to Commit Acts of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Terrorist Rationalization of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The Terrorist���s Ideological or Religious Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 TERRORIST PROFILING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

iv Hazards of Terrorist Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Sociological Characteristics of Terrorists in the Cold War Period . . . . . . 46 A Basic Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Educational, Occupational, and Socioeconomic Background 48 General Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Marital Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Physical Appearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Origin: Rural or Urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Males . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Females . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Characteristics of Female Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Practicality, Coolness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Dedication, Inner Strength, Ruthlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Single-Mindedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Female Motivation for Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Terrorist Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Terrorist Group Mindset Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Promoting Terrorist Group Schisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 How Guerrilla and Terrorist Groups End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES: CASE STUDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Exemplars of International Terrorism in the Early 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Renato Curcio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Leila Khaled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Kozo Okamoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Exemplars of International Terrorism in the Early 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Mahmud Abouhalima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Mohammed A. Salameh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Ahmed Ramzi Yousef . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Ethnic Separatist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Irish Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Kurdistan Workers��� Party (PKK) and Abdullah Ocalan . . 84 Group/Leader Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

v Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Membership Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 LTTE Suicide Commandos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Leader Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Velupillai Prabhakaran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Social Revolutionary Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Leader Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Abu Nidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Leader Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Ahmad Jibril . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . . . . . . 106 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Leader Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Pedro Antonio Mar��n/Manuel Marulanda V��lez 108 Jorge Brice��o Su��rez (���Mono Jojoy���) . . . . . . . . 109 Germ��n Brice��o Su��rez (���Grannobles���) . . . . . . . 110 ���Eli��cer��� . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) . . . . . . . 112 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Religious Fundamentalist Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Al-Qaida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Leader Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Osama bin Laden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Ayman al-Zawahiri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Subhi Muhammad Abu-Sunnah (���Abu-Hafs al- Masri���) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Hizballah (Party of God) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Leader Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Imad Fa���iz Mughniyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 The Suicide Bombing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Selection of Suicide Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Leader Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Mohammed Mousa (���Abu Marzook���) . . . . . 129 Emad al-Alami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Mohammed Dief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Al-Jihad Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Group Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 New Religious Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Aum Shinrikyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Group/Leader Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Key Leader Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 Yoshinobu Aoyama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 Seiichi Endo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Kiyohide Hayakawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Dr. Ikuo Hayashi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Yoshihiro Inoue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Hisako Ishii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Fumihiro Joyu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Takeshi Matsumoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Hideo Murai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Kiyohide Nakada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Tomomasa Nakagawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Tomomitsu Niimi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Toshihiro Ouchi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Masami Tsuchiya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Table 1. Educational Level and Occupational Background of Right-Wing Terrorists in West Germany, 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Table 2. Ideological Profile of Italian Female Terrorists, January 1970-June 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Table 3. Prior Occupational Profile of Italian Female Terrorists, January 1970-June 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Table 4. Geographical Profile of Italian Female Terrorists, January 1970- June 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Table 5. Age and Relationships Profile of Italian Female Terrorists, January 1970-June 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Table 6. Patterns of Weapons Use by the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975-97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 vi

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: MINDSETS OF MASS DESTRUCTION New Types of Post-Cold War Terrorists In the 1970s and 1980s, it was commonly assumed that terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be counterproductive because such an act would be widely condemned. ���Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead,��� Brian Jenkins (1975:15) opined. Jenkins���s premise was based on the assumption that terrorist behavior is normative, and that if they exceeded certain constraints and employed WMD they would completely alienate themselves from the public and possibly provoke swift and harsh retaliation. This assumption does seem to apply to certain secular terrorist groups. If a separatist organization such as the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) or the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna���ETA), for example, were to use WMD, these groups would likely isolate their constituency and undermine sources of funding and political support. When the assumptions about terrorist groups not using WMD were made in the 1970s and 1980s, most of the terrorist groups making headlines were groups with political or nationalist-separatist agenda. Those groups, with some exceptions, such as the Japanese Red Army (JRA���Rengo Sekigun), had reason not to sabotage their ethnic bases of popular support or other domestic or foreign sympathizers of their cause by using WMD. Trends in terrorism over the past three decades, however, have contradicted the conventional thinking that terrorists are averse to using WMD. It has become increasingly evident that the assumption does not apply to religious terrorist groups or millenarian cults (see Glossary). Indeed, since at least the early 1970s analysts, including (somewhat contradictorily) Jenkins, have predicted that the first groups to employ a weapon of mass destruction would be religious sects with a millenarian, messianic, or apocalyptic mindset. When the conventional terrorist groups and individuals of the early 1970s are compared with terrorists of the early 1990s, a trend can be seen: the emergence of religious fundamentalist and new religious groups espousing the rhetoric of mass-destruction terrorism. In the 1990s, groups motivated by religious imperatives, such as Aum Shinrikyo, Hizballah, and al-Qaida, have grown and proliferated. These groups have a different attitude toward violence���one that is extranormative and seeks to maximize violence against the perceived enemy,

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 2 essentially anyone who is not a fundamentalist Muslim or an Aum Shinrikyo member. Their outlook is one that divides the world simplistically into ���them��� and ���us.��� With its sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995, the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo turned the prediction of terrorists using WMD into reality. Beginning in the early 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo engaged in a systematic program to develop and use WMD. It used chemical or biological WMD in about a dozen largely unreported instances in the first half of the 1990s, although they proved to be no more effective���actually less effective���than conventional weapons because of the terrorists��� ineptitude. Nevertheless, it was Aum Shinrikyo���s sarin attack on the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995, that showed the world how dangerous the mindset of a religious terrorist group could be. The attack provided convincing evidence that Aum Shinrikyo probably would not hesitate to use WMD in a U.S. city, if it had an opportunity to do so. These religiously motivated groups would have no reason to take ���credit��� for such an act of mass destruction, just as Aum Shinrikyo did not take credit for its attack on the Tokyo subway, and just as Osama bin Laden did not take credit for various acts of high- casualty terrorism against U.S. targets in the 1990s. Taking credit means asking for retaliation. Instead, it is enough for these groups to simply take private satisfaction in knowing that they have dealt a harsh blow to what they perceive to be the ���Great Satan.��� Groups unlikely to be deterred by fear of public disapproval, such as Aum Shinrikyo, are the ones who seek chaos as an end in itself. The contrast between key members of religious extremist groups such as Hizballah, al-Qaida, and Aum Shinrikyo and conventional terrorists reveals some general trends relating to the personal attributes of terrorists likely to use WMD in coming years. According to psychologist Jerrold M. Post (1997), the most dangerous terrorist is likely to be the religious terrorist. Post has explained that, unlike the average political or social terrorist, who has a defined mission that is somewhat measurable in terms of media attention or government reaction, the religious terrorist can justify the most heinous acts ���in the name of Allah,��� for example. One could add, ���in the name of Aum Shinrikyo���s Shoko Asahara.��� Psychologist B.J. Berkowitz (1972) describes six psychological types who would be most likely to threaten or try to use WMD: paranoids, paranoid schizophrenics, borderline mental defectives, schizophrenic types, passive-aggressive personality (see Glossary) types, and sociopath (see Glossary) personalities. He considers sociopaths the most likely actually to use WMD. Nuclear terrorism expert Jessica

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 3 Stern (1999: 77) disagrees. She believes that ���Schizophrenics and sociopaths, for example, may want to commit acts of mass destruction, but they are less likely than others to succeed.��� She points out that large-scale dissemination of chemical, biological, or radiological agents requires a group effort, but that ���Schizophrenics, in particular, often have difficulty functioning in groups....��� Stern���s understanding of the WMD terrorist appears to be much more relevant than Berkowitz���s earlier stereotype of the insane terrorist. It is clear from the appended case study of Shoko Asahara that he is a paranoid. Whether he is schizophrenic or sociopathic is best left to psychologists to determine. The appended case study of Ahmed Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing on February 26, 1993, reported here does not suggest that he is schizophrenic or sociopathic. On the contrary, he appears to be a well- educated, highly intelligent Islamic terrorist. In 1972 Berkowitz could not have been expected to foresee that religiously motivated terrorists would be prone to using WMD as a way of emulating God or for millenarian reasons. This examination of about a dozen groups that have engaged in significant acts of terrorism suggests that the groups most likely to use WMD are indeed religious groups, whether they be wealthy cults like Aum Shinrikyo or well-funded Islamic terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hizballah. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally changed the operating structures of European terrorist groups. Whereas groups like the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Faktion���RAF see Glossary) were able to use East Germany as a refuge and a source of logistical and financial resources during the Cold War decades, terrorist groups in the post Cold War period no longer enjoy the support of communist countries. Moreover, state sponsors of international terrorism (see Glossary) toned down their support of terrorist groups. In this new environment where terrorist groups can no longer depend on state support or any significant popular support, they have been restructuring in order to learn how to operate independently. New breeds of increasingly dangerous religious terrorists emerged in the 1990s. The most dangerous type is the Islamic fundamentalist. A case in point is Ramzi Yousef, who brought together a loosely organized, ad hoc group, the so-called Liberation Army, apparently for the sole purpose of carrying out the WTC operation on February 26, 1993. Moreover, by acting independently the small self-contained cell led by Yousef prevented authorities from linking it to an established terrorist organization, such as its suspected coordinating group,

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 4 (www.GreatBuildings.com/buildings/ World_Trade_Center.html) Osama bin Laden���s al-Qaida, or a possible state sponsor. Aum Shinrikyo is representative of the other type of religious terrorist group, in this case a cult. Shoko Asahara adopted a different approach to terrorism by modeling his organization on the structure of the Japanese government rather than an ad hoc terrorist group. Accordingly, Aum Shinrikyo ���ministers��� undertook a program to develop WMD by bringing together a core group of bright scientists skilled in the modern technologies of the computer, telecommunications equipment, information databases, and financial networks. They proved themselves capable of developing rudimentary WMD in a relatively short time and demonstrated a willingness to use them in the most lethal ways possible. Aum Shinrikyo���s sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 marked the official debut of terrorism involving WMD. Had a more lethal batch of sarin been used, or had the dissemination procedure been improved slightly, the attack might have killed thousands of people, instead of only a few. Both of these incidents���the WTC bombing and the Tokyo subway sarin attack���had similar casualty totals but could have had massive casualties. Ramzi Yousef���s plot to blow up the WTC might have killed an estimated 50,000 people had his team not made a minor error in the placement of the bomb. In any case, these two acts in Manhattan and Tokyo seem an ominous foretaste of the WMD terrorism to come in the first decade of the new millennium. Increasingly, terrorist groups are recruiting members with expertise in fields such as communications, computer programming, engineering, finance, and the sciences. Ramzi Yousef graduated from Britain���s Swansea University with a degree in engineering. Aum Shinrikyo���s Shoko Asahara recruited a scientific team with all the expertise needed to develop WMD. Osama bin Laden also recruits highly skilled professionals in the fields of engineering, medicine, chemistry, physics, computer programming, communications, and so forth. Whereas the skills of the elite terrorist commandos of the 1960s and 1970s were often limited to what they learned in training camp, the terrorists of the 1990s who have carried out major operations have included biologists, chemists, computer specialists, engineers, and physicists.

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 5 New Forms of Terrorist-Threat Scenarios The number of international terrorist incidents has declined in the 1990s, but the potential threat posed by terrorists has increased. The increased threat level, in the form of terrorist actions aimed at achieving a larger scale of destruction than the conventional attacks of the previous three decades of terrorism, was dramatically demonstrated with the bombing of the WTC. The WTC bombing illustrated how terrorists with technological sophistication are increasingly being recruited to carry out lethal terrorist bombing attacks. The WTC bombing may also have been a harbinger of more destructive attacks of international terrorism in the United States. Although there are not too many examples, if any, of guerrilla (see Glossary) groups dispatching commandos to carry out a terrorist operation in the United States, the mindsets of four groups discussed herein���two guerrilla/terrorist groups, a terrorist group, and a terrorist cult���are such that these groups pose particularly dangerous actual or potential terrorist threats to U.S. security interests. The two guerrilla/terrorist groups are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) and Hizballah, the terrorist group is al-Qaida, and the terrorist cult is Aum Shinrikyo. The LTTE is not known to have engaged in anti-U.S. terrorism to date, but its suicide commandos have already assassinated a prime minister of India, a president of Sri Lanka, and a former prime minister of Sri Lanka. In August 1999, the LTTE reportedly deployed a 10-member suicide squad in Colombo to assassinate Prime Minister Chandrika Kumaratunga and others. It cannot be safely assumed, however, that the LTTE will restrict its terrorism to the South Asian subcontinent. Prabhakaran has repeatedly warned the Western nations providing military support to Sri Lanka that they are exposing their citizens to possible attacks. The LTTE, which has an extensive international network, should not be underestimated in the terrorist threat that it could potentially pose to the United States, should it perceive this country as actively aiding the Sri Lankan government���s counterinsurgency campaign. Prabhakaran is a megalomaniac whose record of ordering the assassinations of heads of state or former presidents, his meticulous planning of such actions, his compulsion to have the acts photographed and chronicled by LTTE members, and the limitless supply of female suicide commandos at his disposal add a dangerous new dimension to potential assassination threats. His highly trained and disciplined Black Tiger commandos are far more deadly than Aum Shinrikyo���s inept cultists. There is little protection against the LTTE���s trademark weapon: a belt-bomb suicide

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 6 commando. Hizballah is likewise quite dangerous. Except for its ongoing terrorist war against Israel, however, it appears to be reactive, often carrying out terrorist attacks for what it perceives to be Western military, cultural, or political threats to the establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon. The threat to U.S. interests posed by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in particular was underscored by al-Qaida���s bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. With those two devastating bombings, Osama bin Laden resurfaced as a potent terrorist threat to U.S. interests worldwide. Bin Laden is the prototype of a new breed of terrorist���the private entrepreneur who puts modern enterprise at the service of a global terrorist network. With its sarin attack against the Tokyo subway system in March 1995, Aum Shinrikyo has already used WMD, and very likely has not abandoned its quest to use such weapons to greater effect. The activities of Aum���s large membership in Russia should be of particular concern because Aum Shinrikyo has used its Russian organization to try to obtain WMD, or at least WMD technologies. The leaders of any of these groups���Prabhakaran, bin Laden, and Asahara���could become paranoid, desperate, or simply vengeful enough to order their suicide devotees to employ the belt-bomb technique against the leader of the Western World. Iranian intelligence leaders could order Hizballah to attack the U.S. leadership in retaliation for some future U.S. or Israeli action, although Iran may now be distancing itself from Hizballah. Whether or not a U.S. president would be a logical target of Asahara, Prabhakaran, or bin Laden is not a particularly useful guideline to assess the probability of such an attack. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was not a logical target for the LTTE, and his assassination had very negative consequences for the LTTE. In Prabhakaran���s ���psycho-logic,��� to use Post���s term, he may conclude that his cause needs greater international attention, and targeting a country���s top leaders is his way of getting attention. Nor does bin Laden need a logical reason, for he believes that he has a mandate from Allah to punish the ���Great Satan.��� Instead of thinking logically, Asahara thinks in terms of a megalomaniac with an apocalyptic outlook. Aum Shinrikyo is a group whose delusional leader is genuinely paranoid about the United States and is known to have plotted to assassinate Japan���s emperor. Shoko Asahara���s cult is already on record for having made an assassination threat against President Clinton.

Library of Congress ��� Federal Research Division The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism 7 If Iran���s mullahs or Iraq���s Saddam Hussein decide to use terrorists to attack the continental United States, they would likely turn to bin Laden���s al-Qaida. Al-Qaida is among the Islamic groups recruiting increasingly skilled professionals, such as computer and communications technicians, engineers, pharmacists, and physicists, as well as Ukrainian chemists and biologists, Iraqi chemical weapons experts, and others capable of helping to develop WMD. Al-Qaida poses the most serious terrorist threat to U.S. security interests, for al-Qaida���s well-trained terrorists are actively engaged in a terrorist jihad against U.S. interests worldwide. These four groups in particular are each capable of perpetrating a horrific act of terrorism in the United States, particularly on the occasion of the new millennium. Aum Shinrikyo has already threatened to use WMD in downtown Manhattan or in Washington, D.C., where it could attack the Congress, the Pentagon���s Concourse, the White House, or President Clinton. The cult has threatened New York City with WMD, threatened to assassinate President Clinton, unsuccessfully attacked a U.S. naval base in Japan with biological weapons, and plotted in 1994 to attack the White House and the Pentagon with sarin and VX. If the LTTE���s serial assassin of heads of state were to become angered by President Clinton, Prabhakaran could react by dispatching a Tamil ���belt-bomb girl��� to detonate a powerful semtex bomb after approaching the President in a crowd with a garland of flowers or after jumping next to his car. Al-Qaida���s expected retaliation for the U.S. cruise missile attack against al- Qaida���s training facilities in Afghanistan on August 20, 1998, could take several forms of terrorist attack in the nation���s capital. Al-Qaida could detonate a Chechen-type building-buster bomb at a federal building. Suicide bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaida���s Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House. Ramzi Yousef had planned to do this against the CIA headquarters. In addition, both al-Qaida and Yousef were linked to a plot to assassinate President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Following the August 1998 cruise missile attack, at least one Islamic religious leader called for Clinton���s assassination, and another stated that ���the time is not far off��� for when the White House will be destroyed by a nuclear bomb. A horrendous scenario consonant with al-Qaida���s mindset would be its use of a nuclear suitcase bomb against any number of targets in the nation���s capital. Bin Laden allegedly has already purchased a number of nuclear suitcase bombs from the Chechen Mafia. Al-Qaida���s retaliation, however, is more likely to take the lower-risk form of bombing one or more U.S. airliners with time-