Stability and diversity in collective adaptation

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Abstract

We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally achieves the best action and memory loss that leads to randomized behavior. We show that, although individual agents interact with their environment and other agents in a purely self-interested way, macroscopic behavior can be interpreted as game dynamics. Application to several familiar, explicit game interactions shows that the adaptation dynamics exhibits a diversity of collective behaviors. The simplicity of the assumptions underlying the macroscopic equations suggests that these behaviors should be expected broadly in collective adaptation. We also analyze the adaptation dynamics from an information-theoretic viewpoint and discuss self-organization induced by the dynamics of uncertainty, giving a novel view of collective adaptation. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Sato, Y., Akiyama, E., & Crutchfield, J. P. (2005). Stability and diversity in collective adaptation. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 210(1–2), 21–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physd.2005.06.031

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