A Fallacy in Constructivist Epistemology
ROBIN SMALL
Constructivism comes in a number of forms. Some are models
of learning which involve few, if any, startling epistemological
claims. On the other hand, what has been promoted as
‘radical constructivism’ holds that our concepts cannot be
related directly to an external reality, and that claims for the
objectivity of knowledge are therefore unjustified. This
standpoint is an anti-realist version of evolutionary
epistemology. I argue that it relies on a mistaken
interpretation of the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural
selection, and that its application of this model to the relation
between knowledge and the world is also mistaken.
Constructivism is a continuing influence in science and mathematics
education, not only in the school classroom but in the educational research
that supports and extends its approach to teaching and learning. A number
of philosophers of education have turned their attention to this
phenomenon, and made efforts to address the issues that it raises for
them. At times they have found this a challenging task, because
constructivism is not easy to pin down. At the pedagogical level, it may
be said to arise from recognition of the active role of the student in the
learning process, and the presence of existing understandings that need to
be taken into account by teachers wishing their students to achieve a
genuine grasp of current scientific knowledge. When these insights are
taken up by educational psychology, the result is a theory of cognitive
development that emphasises the role of mental models, and the ways in
which their development is influenced by experience, activity and
interaction.
However, a theory of learning can hardly be separate from a theory of
knowledge, and that is where epistemology comes in. Philosophers of
education have pointed out that the constructivist movement has many
affinities with the Deweyan tradition, as well as with the theories of
writers such as Piaget. In a recent analysis, Vanderstraeten (2002) argues
that a more defensible version of the constructivist position can in fact be
attained by retrieving Dewey’s ideas on the individual organism’s
interactive relation to its environment, and the concept of active learning
that this supports. Such a ‘transactional’ theory, as he points out, departs
radically from the dualistic assumptions of much of the modern
philosophy of mind. Now, it should be recalled that Dewey’s thought
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2003
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was strongly influenced not just by such biological models but also by
Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection. In this
discussion I want to address that source in a more direct way, by focusing
on the relation of constructivism to evolutionary psychology, and
especially to evolutionary epistemology, that is, to the theory of
knowledge that takes as its starting point the successful Darwinian
explanatory model for countless features—behavioural as well as
physical—of living organisms.
This is a theme that I think has not been addressed so far in the
contributions of philosophers of education to the debate over constructi-
vism. Indeed, the initiative has come from the other side, the side of
supporters of constructivism who have extended their thinking into issues
of epistemology. The outcome is a theory of knowledge that holds that our
concepts cannot be related directly to an external reality, and that claims
for the objectivity of knowledge are therefore unjustified. It is true that
constructivism comes in a number of versions. Some are models of
learning that involve few, if any, startling epistemological claims. On the
other hand, what has been offered under the promotional heading of
‘radical constructivism’ is quite self-conscious about its philosophical
character. In this discussion, I will consider an argument that is crucial to
that brand of constructivism, but that has wider implications for
epistemology. I will show that it relies on a mistaken interpretation of
the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection, and that its
application of this model to the relation between knowledge and the world
is also in a way mistaken.
In brief, the fallacy arises from assuming that since the concept of
fitness or adaptation is a relational one, it must be given a relativist
interpretation. The conclusion is then drawn that fitness or its absence says
nothing about the actual properties either of organisms or of their
environments. In radical constructivism, this same line of argument is
used with reference to knowledge. Thus, the philosophical side of radical
constructivism is an anti-realist version of evolutionary epistemology. By
‘evolutionary epistemology’ I mean the theory that all knowledge results
from devising and testing concepts (or theories) by processes analogous to
those by which species evolve, adapt or become extinct. By itself, this
does not give an answer to one of the most traditional philosophical
problems about knowledge. Does the success of a theory tell us anything
about its actual objects? This is similar to: does the success of a species
tell us anything about its actual environment? The constructivist answer is
‘no’ in both cases. Hence, it concludes that the ‘fitness’ of a theory does
not make it an accurate representation of reality.
The relations between philosophy and natural science have varied
between a partnership, a modest role for philosophy as a summary of the
general results of science, and claims for the authority of philosophy over
science. At times this last version has led to ill-advised attempts by
philosophers to provide a quick and easy refutation of some scientific
theory. I think we can see a case in point in the line of argument, aimed
against Darwinism, which underlies the constructivist interpretation of
484 R. Small
r The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 2003.