Abnormal Science for Abnormal Perception: A Case for Theoretical Cognitive Science via a Case Study of Narrow Slit Viewing

Abstract

Anorthoscopic perception is good perception under abnormal viewing conditions. One such scenario is when a wider view of the world is perceived than can be sensed at any one time when looking through a narrow slit. Thus, narrow slit viewing and aperture viewing are common nicknames for this phenomenon. Somehow, visual information must be integrated across viewpoints and one fundamental issue is whether this occurs at the finer-grained locus of sensation, or the larger-grained locus of perception. This paper supports a fine-grained sensory model (Leibovitz, 2013a). The wider view of abnormal perception will also be used as a metaphor to the unified view of theoretical science as compared to the experimental branch. While analyzing, modeling and theorizing are epistemic activities of both branches, their goals and hence nature will differ. This paper will summarize such differences and introduce theoretical cognitive science via a case study. One surprising difference is that abnormal or holistic analysis requires not only greater epistemic breadth, but must also induce finer ontological grains. An epistemic problem for holistic analysis is in determining the wider scope applicable for the study of a target phenomenon. This is where theory can inform data. In this paper, we use an ontological, fine-grained and unified theory of cognition (Leibovitz, 2013b) to scope out the relevant neurobiological structures and related phenomena that bear on the target phenomenon of anorthoscopic perception. Finally, this paper constitutes the theoretical analysis of alternative theories and phenomenon in support for our own theory of narrow slit viewing (Leibovitz, 2013a). In essence, we exemplify abnormal science over abnormal perception, i.e., of theoretical cognitive science for anorthoscopic perception.