Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
CITATION STYLE
Henne, P., Semler, J., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2019). Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture. Philosophia (United States), 47(1), 131–139. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7
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