'Agon' izing over consensus: Why Habermasian ideals cannot be 'real'

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Abstract

I explore the core Habermasian concept of rational consensus-formation and its counterfactuality before introducing the possibility of permanence of conflict, non-reciprocity and domination (i.e. of agonism) which may productively explain some of the power-games enacted in planning decision-making. In so doing I draw on the concept of agonism and introduce the political into Habermas' moral theorization. Where the personal and the political intersect there is a role for psychology. I illustrate how Habermas' communicative theorizing was itself partly developed from a psychoanalytical tradition before introducing some of the concepts popularized by Jacques Lacan. I conclude that development of communicative planning theory could usefully retain some of Habermas' psychological foundations while turning to the work of Lacan as a basis for an enhanced understanding of the realities of planning practice. Copyright © 2003 SAGE Publications.

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Hillier, J. (2003). “Agon” izing over consensus: Why Habermasian ideals cannot be “real.” Planning Theory, 2(1), 37–59. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095203002001005

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