Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphysics, while grounding the doctrine of anomalous monism, makes impossible a successful response to the problem of explanatory force in terms of a causal theory of action.
CITATION STYLE
Antony, L. (1989). Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force. The Philosophical Review, 98(2), 153. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185281
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