Blockchain and a problem of procedural justice of public choice

Abstract

In public policy theory there is a problem of just procedure which could be used in obtaining a fair result in decision. Blockchain as a network of distributed registers is often positioned as an institution ensuring the fairness of decisions by voting on the basis of a consensual procedure. Consensus is achieved in the blockchain interactions through various algorithms (Proof of Work, Proof of Stake, Byzantine Fault Tolerance, Modified Federated Byzantine Agreement) that provide different rules for a procedural justice. Current political theory distinguishes between pure, perfect and imperfect procedural justice. The article analyzes the political ontology of the pure procedural justice of blockchain-technology. This ontology relies not on the legal nature of interaction in the network, but on the technical and social immediacy of trust, cooperation and co-production. The empirical basis of the study is the analysis of cases of using blockchain-voting on the platform of “Active Citizen” (Moscow).