Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018

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Abstract

Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.

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APA

Williams, P. D. (2020). Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(3), 366–391. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210

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