According to probabilistic theories of causation, causal relations are analyzed using probabilities of the form P(EICB) and P(El tilde CB), where B is an elaborate conjunction of background conditions. Why should so much philosophical interest be directed toward a concept having just this structure? The answer is that probabilities of just this form figure in our rational deliberations, as codified by causal decision theory. Why should we deliberate using probabilities of this form? A natural answer is that these probabilities indicate the effects of our actions; but this answer traps us in an unilluminating circle. In order to break out of this circle, I offer a different defense of causal decision theory. This defense is based upon arguments normally marshalled in favor of evidential decision theory.
CITATION STYLE
Hitchcock, C. R. (1996). Causal Decision Theory and Decision-theoretic Causation. Noûs, 30(4), 508. https://doi.org/10.2307/2216116
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