Systems designed with measurement and attestation in mind are often layered, with the lower layers measuring the layers above them. Attestations of such systems must report the results of a diverse set of application-specific measurements of various parts of the system. There is a pervasive intuition that measuring the system “bottom-up” (i.e. measuring lower layers before the layers above them) is more robust than other orders of measurement. This is the core idea behind trusted boot processes. In this paper we justify this intuition by characterizing the adversary actions required to escape detection by bottom-up measurement. In support of that goal, we introduce a formal framework with a natural and intuitive graphical representation for reasoning about layered measurement systems.
CITATION STYLE
Rowe, P. D. (2016). Confining adversary actions via measurement. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9987 LNCS, pp. 150–166). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46263-9_10
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