The Contradiction of "the Contradiction of Determinism"

  • Dwyer W
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Abstract

Nathaniel branden has argued that since determinism precludes the freedom to test and reject false beliefs, it precludes knowledge that any of one's beliefs, including determinism, are true. i show that since such freedom does not exist anyway, if branden's argument is true, then knowledge is impossible, in which case, so is knowledge of the truth of branden's argument. i conclude that, far from determinism being self-refuting, it is branden's argument against determinism which is self-refuting.

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APA

Dwyer, W. (1972). The Contradiction of “the Contradiction of Determinism.” Personalist, 53 94-101.

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