Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach

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Abstract

Recently developed toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and botnet defence in cyber-security with three or four states of agents are extended to a more general mean-field-game model with 2d states, d∈ N. In order to tackle new technical difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymptotic regimes, namely small discount and small interaction asymptotics. Moreover, the link between stationary and time-dependent solutions is established rigorously leading to a performance of the turnpike theory in a mean-field-game setting.

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Kolokoltsov, V. N., & Malafeyev, O. A. (2018). Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach. International Journal of Game Theory, 47(3), 977–999. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0614-1

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