Sign up & Download
Sign in

Equilibrium solution to the lowest unique positive integer game

by Seung Ki Baek, Sebastian Bernhardsson
()

Abstract

We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a precise analysis in previous works. We here present a systematic way to reach the solution for a general number of players, and show that this game is an example of conflict between the group and the individual interests.

Cite this document (BETA)

Readership Statistics

5 Readers on Mendeley
by Discipline
 
 
 
by Academic Status
 
40% Ph.D. Student
 
20% Student (Master)
 
20% Doctoral Student
by Country
 
20% United Kingdom

Sign up today - FREE

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research. Learn more

  • All your research in one place
  • Add and import papers easily
  • Access it anywhere, anytime

Start using Mendeley in seconds!

Already have an account? Sign in