We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a precise analysis in previous works. We here present a systematic way to reach the solution for a general number of players, and show that this game is an example of conflict between the group and the individual interests. © 2010 World Scientific Publishing Company.
CITATION STYLE
Baek, S. K., & Bernhardsson, S. (2010). Equilibrium solution to the lowest unique positive integer game. Fluctuation and Noise Letters, 9(1), 61–68. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219477510000071
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