ORIGINAL PAPER
The Ethics of Memory Blunting and the Narcissism of Small
Differences
Erik Parens
Received: 25 November 2009 /Accepted: 19 April 2010
#
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract At least since 2003, when the US Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics published Beyond Ther-
apy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness,
there has been heated debate about the ethics of using
pharmacology to reduce the intensity of emotions
associated with painful memories. That debate has
sometimes been conducted in language that obfus-
cates as much as it illuminates. I argue that the two
sides of the debate actually agree that, in general, it is
good to reduce the emotional intensity of memories
associated with traumatic events, when (as in the case
of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) the intensity of
those memories is disproportionate to the precipitat-
ing traumatic event. Both sides also agree that, in
general—not as an ironclad rule—it is bad to reduce
the emotional intensity of memories associated with
difficult but normal human problems of living, when
the intensity of the emotions is proportionate to those
problems. Between those two areas of agreement,
there is a zone of ambiguity, in which reasonable
people, who proceed from different but equally
ethical frameworks, may indeed reach different con-
clusions about the same set of facts. But I will argue
that even in the zone of ambiguity, there is more
agreement than the language favored by the different
frameworks sometimes suggests. Ultimately, I suggest
that if we see the extent to which the substantive
differences between the two frameworks are smaller
than their articulators’ language sometimes suggests,
we can engage in a more productive conversation
about whether a particular intervention will facilitate
or diminish human flourishing.
Keywords Post-traumatic stress disorder
.
Propranolol
.
Memory blunting
.
Medicalization
It is precisely communities with adjoining terri-
tories, and related to each other in other ways as
well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in
ridiculing each other—like the Spaniards and
Portuguese, for instance, the North Germans and
South Germans, the English and Scotch, and so
on. I gave this phenomenon the name of “the
narcissism of small differences….”
Sigmund Freud,Civilization and Its Discontents
The ethical conversation about blunting the intensity
of emotions associated with painful memories began in
earnest in the US with the publication of a report by the
President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB). That report,
Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of
Happiness [1], did not make a single policy recom-
mendation about any biotechnological intervention—
unless we should count the recommendation that the
nation proceed “with its eyes wide open” (p. 310). But
Neuroethics
DOI 10.1007/s12152-010-9070-8
E. Parens (*)
Senior Research Scholar, The Hastings Center,
21 Malcolm Gordon Rd.,
Garrison, NY 10524-5555, USA
e-mail: parense@thehastingscenter.org

the report’s often portentous tone, with mention of evil
doers and allusion to Lotus eaters, elicited portentous
responses.
In one response to the portion of Beyond Therapy
that was specifically about memory blunting, three
coauthors, in the American Journal of Bioethics
(AJOB) [2], floated the possibility that the PCB might
be advocating that the state become the “enforcer” of
“a religious fundamentalism that claims divine
knowledge of right and wrong” (p. 17). They added,
“If this were not the Council’s intent, it surely would
have reassured the reader to the contrary” [sic].
Unfortunately, the tone of those two documents
can distract us from noticing some fundamental issues
about which their authors agree. It can also distract us
from understanding where and why reasonable people
do sometimes disagree. Without clarity about where
the two sides don’t—and do—agree, it’s difficult to
make headway in the conversation about the ethics of
using new techniques to blunt the intensity of
emotions associated with traumatic memories.
In this essay I will suggest that the PCB authors
and the AJOB authors in fact agree about the badness
of helping future Lady Macbeths get over the
punishing memories of their treacherous acts—and
that they also agree about the goodness of helping
veterans get over the traumatic memories that keep
them from engaging in the sorts of activities and
relationships that humans need to be happy. Between
future Lady Macbeths and returning vets, however,
there is a zone of ambiguity in which different people
will reach different conclusions about the same case.
By briefly describing two ethical frameworks that
can motivate different conclusions in the zone of
ambiguity, I aim to show how those different
conclusions can be reasonable—and worthy of re-
spect. Ultimately, though, I will emphasize that
people from the two frameworks agree about more
than their tones sometimes suggest. Perhaps if we see
the extent to which the substantive differences
between the two frameworks are smaller than their
articulators’ tones sometimes suggest, we can engage
in a more productive conversation about the differ-
ence between good and bad uses of drugs intended to
reduce the intensity of emotions associated with
painful memories. Such a conversation would seek
to understand whether, given a particular set of facts,
a memory-blunting intervention would facilitate or
thwart a given person’s flourishing.
Agreement That Eating Lotus Flowers
Would Be Bad
We in the West have long contemplated what it would
mean, not just to blunt the emotional intensity of
some memories, but to erase them altogether. Homer
sang of Odysseus’s visit to a land whose inhabitants
ate mythical Lotus flowers, which made humans
forget everything they ever knew. Upon eating the
flowers, several of Odysseus’s men completely forgot
their earlier lives of human action and relationship.
They became blissfully contented, as Tennyson much
later would retell it, to “lie reclined on the hills like
Gods together, careless of mankind.” The erasure of
Odysseus’s men’s memories made them inhuman.
To assert the badness of eating Homer’s Lotus
flowers on the grounds that it would make us
inhuman, however, is as uncontroversial as asserting
the badness of imbibing Huxley’s Soma on the same
grounds (as the PCB does in another part of its
report). As Neil Levy [3], David Wasserman [4], and
others who generally find the tone of the PCB report
uncongenial have suggested, insofar as being a self or
having an identity (in the characterization or narrative
sense) requires having memories, erasing all of one’s
memories would be tantamount to annihilating one’s
self. Though the AJOB authors did not address the
theoretical possibility of total memory erasure, they
do allow that “Memory and its relationship to emotion
clearly are vital to human functioning and flourishing
and are very complex” (p. 14). It doesn’t seem unfair
to infer that they, too, would be against eating Lotus
flowers.
Agreement That Giving Lady Macbeth Solace
in a Capsule Would Be Bad
The PCB is not, however, primarily worried about us
becoming inhuman. Their primary worry is that we
will become less human, less able to enjoy “true
human happiness.” On the PCB’s neo-Aristotelian
view, for humans to truly flourish, or to be truly
happy, we need to engage in meaningful activities and
be with others. According to this view, we don’t just
want the feeling of happiness or flourishing or
fulfillment that working well or loving well normally
produces. We want to engage in the activities that
normally give rise to those feelings. The PCB wants
E. Parens