Fuzzy logic: a spectrum of theoretical & practical issues

Abstract

Foxall introduces mental constructs into his modified behaviorism. His goals are praiseworthy, as a reconciliation of public behavior with private dialog-one that improves on contemporary extensions of behaviorism-must be achieved if our epistemology is to flourish. Despite Foxall's scholarship, however, he has not convinced me. Rather than view intentions-beliefs, attitudes, and desires-as primary causal mechanisms, I see them as elements in an internal or external dialog elicited by ourselves or others to help (ourselves or others) predict and control our behavior. Respectively, they identify discriminative stimuli, behavioral propensities, and reinforcers, which may be effective with or without our awareness of them. Sometimes the identifications are veridical. Once educed-whether by ourselves or others, whether accurate or fabulousthose characterizations can take on a life of their own as controlling stimuli, filtering and framing subsequent perceptions, providing the material for ratiocination, and biasing output. Foxall seems to put it the other way around, with intentions as primary. Although buttressed by the counsel of wise philosophers, this stance is out of plumb with the ambiguity, fallibility, and conventionality of intensions.