moral intuitions. It is a transcendental argument. It proceeds from
contingently true, empirical premises – for example, that the moral
standpoint is part of the social world, that there are valid moral
norms. It then investigates the conditions of their possibility. If a
moral standpoint exists, there must be a principle or criterion for
demarcating moral from non-moral considerations, and this
principle must be implicitly contained in our moral practices.
Habermas’s elucidation of the moral standpoint proceeds in this
manner and eventually uncovers two principles: the discourse
principle (D) and the moral principle (U).
The principles of discourse ethics
Why are there two principles of discourse ethics rather than one?
This is a good question, and one for which Habermas has no
clear-cut answer. Eventually, he comes to the view that the
discourse principle (D) is weaker and less controversial than the
moral principle (U), and has already been made plausible by his
theory of communication. (U) is a stronger principle which has to
be established by means of an argument that makes use of (D) as
a premise.
The essential point of Habermas’s theory is that discourse can fulfil
its social and pragmatic function all the better because it is a
dialogical process, a process that draws people together into
meaningful argument. The process of justifying a norm always
involves more than one person, since it is a question of one person
making the norm acceptable to another. Habermas states that (D)
merely ‘expresses the meaning of post-conventional requirements
The discourse principle (D) states that:
Only those action norms are valid to which all possibly
affected persons could agree as participants in rational
discourse.
(BFN, 107)
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The Philosophy of Habermas, Andrew Edgar (Teddington: Acumen,
2004).
Collections of essays on Habermas’s theoretical work
Habermas: Critical Debates, ed. J. B. Thompson and D. Held (London:
Macmillan, 1982). This is not recent, but is still a valuable collection
that contains Habermas’s replies to his critics. Addresses programmes
1, 2, and 3.
Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas’s ‘ The Theory of
Communicative Action’, ed. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, tr. Jeremy
Gains and Doris L. Jones (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). Collects
together some critical responses to The Theory of Communicative
Action. Covers programmes 1, 2, and 3.
The Communicative Ethics Controversy, ed. Seyla Benhabib and
F. Dallmayr (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). A useful collection
of material on discourse ethics. Programme 4.
Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in
Contemporary Critical Theory, Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). A collection of essays by Habermas’s most
longstanding critic and intellectual fellow traveller. Deals with
programmes 3, 4, and 5.
Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment,
ed. Axel Honneth et al., tr. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1992) and Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of
Enlightenment, ed. Axel Honneth et al., tr. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). These two companion volumes contain critical
responses to all aspects of Habermas’s philosophy. The list of
contributors reads like a ‘Who’s Who?’ of social theory. Examines
programmes 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays
on the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, ed. Seyla Benhabib
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