Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality

Abstract

THIS ARTICLE IS AN ATTEMPT TO EXPOUND AND DISTINGUISHBRENTANO'S CONCEPT OF "INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE" (FOUND IN'PSYCHOLOGIE VON EINEM EMPIRISCHEN STANDPUNKT') ANDHUSSERL'S EARLY CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY (IN 'LOGISCHEUNTERSUCHUNGEN'). THE MAIN PURPOSE IS TO SHOW THATHUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWS ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROMAND FAR MORE DEVELOPED THAN BRENTANO'S AND THAT HE REJECTSMANY OF HIS CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES. FIRST, BRENTANO'SDESIGNATION OF EIGHT DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF MENTALPHENOMENA, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO DEFINE PSYCHOLOGY, ISOUTLINED. THIS IS FOLLOWED BY A DETAILED DISCUSSION OFHUSSERL'S CRITICISMS AND REVISIONS, EMPHASIZING WHATHUSSERL THOUGHT WAS BRENTANO'S MOST IMPORTANT INSIGHT,I.E., THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS INTENTIONAL. A DISCUSSION OFTHREE VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS GIVEN,CONCLUDING WITH HUSSERL'S GENERAL CRITICISMS THAT BRENTANOFELL VICTIM TO DUALISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THAT HISCONCEPT OF THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF MIND WAS DISTORTED BYA COMMITMENT TO NATURALISM, THE LATTER BEING OVERCOME ONLYBY HUSSERL'S OWN TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY IN 'IDEEN'AND LATER WORKS.