An Intentional Fallacy in Epistemology
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1981)
- ISSN: 00455091
Abstract
Various objections are given to the thesis that what is known and what is believed cannot be the same made by zeno vendler, Both in his book "res cogitans" and in his 1978 article in "canadian journal of philosophy". It is argued that he really resurrects the old fallacy that the objects of intentional verbs, Including 'believe', Are propositions.
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