Linsky on Quine's Way Out
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1976)
- ISSN: 00318205
Abstract
Leonard linsky, In his "referring", Pages 100-104, Presents counterexamples to a possible interpretation of quine's thesis of referential opacity, Viz., That the invalidity of inferences based on the principle of substitutivity of identicals (leibniz's law) in respect to positions in sentences is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-Purely referential status (impure reference) of these positions. I argue that all of linsky's counterexamples miss their mark because they involve a misunderstanding of quine's theory of referential opacity or an over-Simplification of leibniz's law.
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