Merkel cell polyomavirus (MCV)

Abstract

The controversy around cultural relativism, dormant for some time, has recently been resurrected by Derek Freeman (i965). He has also, I think, given the doctrine of cultural relativism an exaggerated importance in anthropological thinking by suggesting that it will not be possible 'for a science of man to come into being' unless we supersede the 'unscientific doctrine' of cultural relativism. Freeman's position derives from a forthright and polemical essay by Bidney (I953). Here, I shall concern myselflargely with the Bidney-Freeman critique of relativism, I shall initially make a brief statement of the relativist position, then consider the criticisms of the relativist credo, and, finally, I shall propose a solution to the presumed 'impasse' reached in anthropology as a result of cultural relativism, by making a distinction between a philosophical and a methodological relativism. There is nothing remarkably new in this distinction, which was noted by Her-skovits (951i: 24), taken up by Schmidt (I9SS: 790) and by Albert (I963: 566). Nevertheless, a further clarification of the distinction will help us to counter the Bidney-Freeman alternatives to relativism. The main argument of the relativists is a simple one: each culture is unique, a product of its own particular historical experience. It can best be understood as a thing in itself. Though the cultural relativists are concerned with all aspects of culture, anthropological discussions of relativism inevitably seem to hinge on ethical relativism, as in Redfield (I953), Kluckhohn (i955), Bidney (I953), Albert (i957). This is because the case for or against relativism often devolves on whether we can compare, evaluate, or make value judgments regarding the great variety of human custom spotlighted by the relativists. Though cultural and ethical relativism