Are mixed electoral systems the best choice for central and Eastern Europe or the reason for defective party systems?

Abstract

Mixed electoral systems have been celebrated enthusiastically in the literature and by political practitioners, arguing that they combine the best of both worlds with regards to several aspects of political representation. This article calls this view into question, arguing that the mixed incentives of mixed electoral systems might hamper the stabilization and institutionalization of party systems in young democracies. Empirical results from 19 democracies in Central and Eastern Europe suggest that the learning and stabilization effect that is exerted through simple electoral systems fails under mixed systems. Using a variance model analysis, this study rejects the common belief that mixed systems lead to more moderate party systems with regards to party system fractionalization. Rather, outcomes under mixed systems vary much more widely than under proportional representation, are associated with higher disproportionality, and tend to increase volatility. © 2009 Policy Studies Organization.