Journal of Borderlands Studies | 24.1 - 2009
34
A Mobile Idea of Space. Traders, Patrons and the
Cross-Border Economy in Sahelian Africa
Olivier Walther *
Acknowledgment Financial support of the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN) is
gratefully acknowledged. The author thanks Denis Retaillé, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Kate Meagher
and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Abstract In the Sahel, the borders still offer suitably fertile ground for informal commerce to bloom. In
that context, this article postulates that contemporary cross-border economic activity illustrates one of the
foundations of what some geographers called mobile space, i.e. that circulation is the most appropriate
method of managing the uncertainty of Sahelian life. The case of the border markets of Gaya (Niger),
Malanville (Benin) and Kamba (Nigeria) provides a concrete example. On this “triple point”, the study
of trade networks suggests that border commerce makes some use of the colonial partition, to the extent
that the establishment of boundaries represents not so much a divide as a condition of contemporary
economic dynamism.
Border markets and the mobile idea of space1
From southern Senegal to northern Cameroon, the presence of national boundaries constitutes a
resource for traders to carry on their business. In border areas, trade networks have formed on a
basis that, to a certain extent, reproduces the way in which Sahelian circulation used to operate.
Several currency and taxation differentials encourage the activity of long distance traders, who
thus develop interregional trade involving reexport on a flexible and informal basis (Igué 1995).
This system of trade based on indirect routes led to the spectacular development of urban centres
located in border areas. Although they may be regarded as the heirs to the great ethnic merchant
groups that characterised the continent’s history, the traders engaged in cross-border commerce
are subject to different constraints from those of the pre-colonial era. Formerly described as “cos-
mopolitan rascals who love the easy life and a means of existence that is sometimes quasi-illicit”
by the colonial literature (Perron 1924, 52, our translation), today’s traders are developing in an
environment that is strongly influenced by the interests of national elites and by programmes un-
dertaken by the international financial institutions (Boone 1994).
The last two decades have therefore seen profound changes in the Sahelian trade networks. Cross-
border trade intensified from the end of the 1980s thanks to the globalisation of trade flows, which
enabled the most influential traders to tap into the world market by making intensive use of the
port infrastructure of the Gulf of Guinea as well as the financial markets that could recycle West
African currencies (Hashim and Meagher 1999). This dynamic became even stronger after struc-
tural adjustment programmes had been put in place; although these programmes were supposed to
reduce market distortions, they ended up making life precarious for the West African populations
and caused people to resort increasingly to products from cross-border informal trade (Meagher
2003).
In that context, this article postulates that contemporary cross-border economic activity illustrates
one of the foundations of what Retaillé (2005) called mobile space, i.e. that in the Sahel circula-
tion takes precedence over production. In his mobile space model, Retaillé argues that, despite
the profound changes that have affected the Sahelian region since colonisation, circulation still is
the most appropriate method of managing the uncertainty of Sahelian life, something that had
already been observed by Gallais (1976) over thirty years ago without really influencing the pro-
grammes of the agencies for development and cooperation.
* Olivier Walther is a research officer in the Department of Geography, Centre for Population, Poverty and
Public Policy Studies, CEPS/INSTEAD, PO. Box 48 L-4501 Differdange, Luxembourg, (+352) 58.58.55.537,
http://metrolux.ceps.lu

Journal of Borderlands Studies | 24.1 - 2009
35
The case of the border markets of Gaya in Niger (33,000 inhabitants in 2005), Malanville in
Benin (58,000) and Kamba in Nigeria (30,000) provides a concrete example (Figure 1). These
three border towns are located about 300 km south-east of Niamey, the capital of Niger, and 300
km south-west of Sokoto, a large market in Northern Nigeria. Gaya and Malanville are two twin
markets located on the Niger river and provide a valuable case study for analysing the effect of
borders on daily activities. Even though the population of Gaya and Malanville share a common
identity and economic space, the two local municipalities lack the institutional framework that
could foster cross-border integration, contrary to other European paired border cities (see Ehlers
2001). On the Nigerian side, the market of Kamba is about 20 km distant. The three cities have
a central position in the trade networks linking Niamey (Niger), Cotonou (Benin) and Lagos
(Nigeria), three import and consumption centres of agricultural and industrial products in this
part of West Africa.
Figure 1. The cross-border area of Gaya-Malanville-Kamba
0 2000 km
NIAMEY
Parakou
SOKOTO
Birnin
Kebbi
Jega
Kandi
Natitingou
Tahoua
Djougou
Kontagora
Madaoua
Illéla
Birnin-
Konni
Dogondoutchi
Dosso
Fada-
Ngourma
Malanville
Gaya
Yelwa
Koko
Talata Mafara
New Bussa
Wawa
Nikki
Kaiama
Kara
Niamtougou
Kouandé
Bafilo
Bembereké
Kamba
Kainguiwa
Argungu
Gwandu
Gwadabawa
N I G E R
T O G O
B U R K I N A
F A S O
B E N I N
N I G E R I A
More than 200 000
60 000 to 200 000
Major roads National borders
River Niger
20 000 to 60 000
Urban population 2005
50 km
Source: Walther 2008

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36
While Sahelian border activity is generally dominated by agents specialising in long distance
trade, such as the Hausa, Dioula and Sarakole, the situation in the border area of Gaya, Malanville
and Kamba is atypical in that trade there is linked more to a secure income than to the presence
of a single ethnic group of traders. Situated on the fringe of the great pre-colonial socio-political
formations, this case study makes it possible to show the emergence of a place of exchange that is
less well-documented than other West African border areas such as the Niger-Nigeria border (see,
among others, Asiwaju and Adeniyi 1989; Grégoire 1986; Miles 2008; Nicolas 1986), but is still as
prosperous (Boluvi 2004; Walther 2008). On this “triple point”, the study of trade networks must
make it possible to show that border commerce makes some use of the colonial partition, to the
extent that the establishment of national boundaries represents not so much a divide as a condition
of contemporary economic dynamism.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the different perspectives that
inform studies of cross-border trade in West Africa and explain the interest of considering an
alternative model based on the idea of “mobile space”. In section 3, we present four basic elements
favouring cross-border circulation, focusing on informal activities, daily border practices, the
evolution of border markets and clientelist relationships. In the final section, we conclude with a
summary of key findings and briefly outline the consequences that cross-border activities might
have on development initiatives.
Cross-border integration and the mobile space approach
For the last past decades, scholars have continued to examine the main driving forces behind
cross-border integration processes (Van Houtum 2000). It is today widely acknowledged that
two fundamental dimensions can be distinguished, i.e. the “institutional” dimension and the
“functional” dimension, the latter being particularly developed in this paper (Joye and Leresche
1997; Sohn, Reitel and Walther 2009). Perkmann (2005: 862), for example, identifies what he
calls a policy-driven integration “based on the building of cooperative relationships between
public and other bodies that share certain interests” and a market-driven integration “based on the
proliferation and/or reactivation of social or economic relationships”. In the same way, Brunet-
Jailly (2006) identifies a political/institutional and an economic integration when studying the
trans-boundary institutionalization and functional interdependency in three North American
metropolitan border areas. Even though many terms have been employed to describe these two
dimensions, the underlying dynamics are similar and now well documented. The institutional
integration is the result of the willingness of actors to co-operate beyond national boundaries. On
this point, Martinez (1994) has shown that cross-border regions could be classified on a range
from a situation of ignorance to one of cooperation, by referring to the phases of co-existence,
interdependence and integration. The functional dimension, on the other side, can be analyzed
as the form and intensity of relations between social and economic actors. It highlights the need
for a double perspective able to consider not only the viewpoint of the States involved but also
the perspective of the people who inhabit the borderlands and organize their day-to-day practices
along and across a boundary (see Donnan and Wilson 1999). As Ratti and Reichman (1993)
noted, a similar gradient can be observed between a situation of separation to a situation of
interaction, with the intermediate phase reflecting the increasing complexity of the cross-border
socio-economic networks.
In West Africa, the distinction between borders as “institutions” and borders as “processes” is
particularly important. As a matter of fact, cross-border regions are very much integrated from
a functional point of view but seem to lack local or regional bodies able to promote cross-border
integration from an institutional point of view (Asiwaju 2000; Bach 1999). This spatial mismatch
seems universal, but is aggravated by at least two factors in West Africa. On the one hand, it
appears that the implementation of border policies very often goes against national interests and
is not really supported by strong supranational institutions (Bach 2008). On the other hand,
international relations are subverted through illegality or exploited through informal activities by
merchants located on both sides of the border.

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37
As highlighted by Hashim and Meagher (1999: 18-20), the vitality of cross-border networks
has led to the emergence of several policy-driven or scientific approaches: (1) A first approach,
influenced by neo-liberal economics and conceiving of cross-border trade as a form of integration
from below (World Bank 1989); (2) An empirical and historical approach mostly developed
by Francophone scholars with a strong emphasis on cultural and ethnic features (Igué and
Soulé 1993); (3) A neo-liberal approach focusing on parallel economic activity and its positive
effects on gender and democracy (MacGaffey 1987); (4) A political science approach, opposed
to the previous one, which stresses the inequality of clientelism (Meagher 1995); and, finally,
(5) A post-modernist approach focusing on the contestation of boundaries (Bach 1999). Until
now, these approaches have rarely converged. More recently, the debate has been enriched by
the contributions of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), which considers regions as social
constructions (Marchand, Boas and Shaw 1999). As in the “mobile space” model presented in
this paper, these authors wish to distance themselves from the “methodological nationalism” that
permeates regional studies in Africa, i.e. the fact that most of the regional studies in Africa have
concerned the inter-national or sub-national level but not the border regions. Both the NRA
and the model presented here focus on “socioeconomic circumstances and historical context in
which regionalism occurs” (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 19) rather than on inter-state formal
frameworks, such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the African Union (AU).
It is out of the scope of this paper to review these different perspectives and present the extent to
which the “mobile space” model can make a significant contribution to the existing literature on
cross-border trade in West Africa. Interested readers can find more by referring to Retaillé (1995)
and Walther and Retaillé (2008) where the model is extensively discussed. However, it is worth
emphasising that this model gradually developed in response to the inadequacies of the traditional
zonal model, which assigned each of the West African bioclimatic areas a productive use (pastoral,
agro-pastoral, agricultural) and a particular lifestyle, either nomadic or sedentary. In the mobile
space model, on the other hand, production in the Sahelian region comes primarily from the
activity of circulation, which affects goods and people as well as the places themselves (Lechartier
2005; Malam Moussa 20072).
Spatial mobility can be seen everywhere in the Sahel. Nevertheless, the urban border markets
represent privileged observatories from which the characteristics of the Sahel region can most
clearly be seen. This is explained by the fact that the development of these markets is characterised
by an extremely mobile centrality. This centrality is sensitive to boundaries being suddenly closed
and moves in line with the affinities of economic agents at a local level and with wider economic
opportunities in a national and international context.
The properties of this spatial structure were unknown to the colonial powers, who attributed a
productive use to areas that mainly lived on circulation, and to the post-colonial states, whose
development policies, supported by international sponsors, generally contributed to rigidifying the
economic system in the Sahel (Retaillé 1986). Admittedly, the subsistence crisis in the Sahelian
economies during the 1970s provided an opportunity to challenge the orientation of the large
development programmes, by focusing more sustained attention on Sahelian communities and
lands. However, it must be acknowledged that, since then, policies aimed at stepping up production,
oriented according to the complementarities offered by the ecological zones rather than integrating the
multiplicity of organisational forms in the Sahelian region have predominated (Retaillé 1989).
In this article, we argue that the spatial strategies developed by Sahelian traders stem from a wish for
modernisation with regard to the mobile idea of space, even if they are using state and development
initiatives to their advantage. These strategies therefore exploit the new opportunities offered by the
establishment of boundaries between states and by the increased demand that occurs as a result
of urbanisation.

Journal of Borderlands Studies | 24.1 - 2009
38
They lead to the emergence of particularly dynamic border market towns whose distinctive feature, in
accordance with the principle of circulation, is that they are intimately dependent on flows oriented
according to the meridians. From this point of view, the informal economic dynamism of the border
may be regarded as a response to the potentialities of the Sahelian region.
Dynamism of the urban border markets
In the Sahel, cross-border circulation is favoured by four basic elements: the informal character
of the economic activities, which encourages opacity and flexibility of routes; the mastery of the
system of trading places that is achieved by negotiated border practices; the moving centrality of
the various market places; clientelist relationships between patrons and clients.
Informal trade
A significant proportion of the border trade in Sahelian Africa makes use of a method of
business that is not recognised by the authorities or is at least organised unofficially on a basis
of backhanders or arbitrary taxes. Although these activities are not structured as cooperatives
or legally constituted companies, their accounts are not kept in accordance with official or state
standards and they are not included in trade registers, informal undertakings do have a specific
organisation in which the support of family or lineage structures is preponderant (Maldonado and
Gaufryau 2001). Furthermore, in a context of rapid urbanisation, trade described as informal is far
from being confined to a restricted geographical scale and from favouring short-term supply. These
properties mean that the term “informal” that is normally used to characterise these activities
must be understood in a relative sense (Soulé 2000). The informal sector makes it possible to deal
with adversity, though without by itself absorbing all the workers available on the market due to a
low level of autonomy in relation to the national economy.
In Niger, for example, the informal sector has grown slowly but lasting from 1978 to 1997, from
about 20% to 35% of GDP, and more rapidly since then, reaching 45% in 2004 (Figure 2). This
increase occurred mainly at the expense of the modern sector (primarily based on uranium mining
whose prices decreased dramatically since the early 1980s) and the agricultural sector. In a context
of pauperisation, the needs of citizens contribute to enlarging the scale on which supply networks
operate and enable some operators to extend into international markets, building up stock and
diversifying their supply as they become richer. Border areas are obviously primarily concerned
by these flows and by the fact that they represent the entry or exit point for goods, as the many
differentials that characterise the legislation and currency of the states in question permit.
Figure 2. Republic of Niger: sectoral evolution as a percentage of total GDP, 1987-2004
Source: Maldonado and Gaufryau 2001; Republic of Niger 2002; UNDP 2003.
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Taxes on imports
Modern sector
Informal sector
Rural sector

Journal of Borderlands Studies | 24.1 - 2009
39
The system of places
Owing to their privileged situation, the border markets are generally characterised by a large
development of their market infrastructure and by a very obvious orientation towards interregional
or reexport flows. Although it is difficult to quantitatively assess the business conducted in these
markets because of the lack of transparency of the flows and their informal nature, it cannot be
denied that some small urban centres can demonstrate significant specialisation and have influence
on a West African scale. These characteristics had already been noted by Igué and N’Bessa (1980),
who found that Malanville had the largest market in Benin after that of Dantokpa in Cotonou,
even though the town had a population of under 15,000 at that time. Since then, the role of
Malanville’s market as a storage point for goods intended for western Niger has been strengthened
further. Its import-export business essentially involves agricultural products from the Gulf of
Guinea or the global market which are then redistributed to Sahelian markets. Thanks to its
strategic geographical position on the Cotonou-Niamey axis, the initiative of non-native traders
who have settled there and a modest level of taxation, the market attracts international customers.
Between 2000 and 2005, imports by the customs office in Gaya, located on the River Niger a few
kilometers away from Malanville, have experienced a strong and regular growth, reaching 8 billion
FCFA (Figure 3)3. These imports highlight the growing dependence of Niger towards cereals
purchased on the world market such as rice and wheat, and a dramatic increase in intermediate
and final goods (plastics, machinery, cement, sugar, milk), stemming from the country’s rapid
urbanization.
Figure 3. Niger imports, 2000-2005
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Imports: Niger
FCFA billion
Imports: Gaya Customs
FCFA billion
Niger
Gaya
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Source: Niger Customs Administration; www.izf.net
Note: The data for 2005 are based on an estimation calculated by the author. Oil is not included.

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40
Being faced with the delicate task of getting goods across administrative boundaries at the best
cost, Sahelian traders have developed border practices that alternate between two non-exclusive
strategies: evasion and arrangement. Evasion, which tends to be employed by small economic
operators, consists in using indirect routes to transport banned products into a given state.
Arrangement, meanwhile, relates to a negotiation between traders and the officials responsible for
the surveillance of the national territory and is an essential requirement when sizeable flows are
conveyed across borders on a regular basis (Grégoire 1991).
Examples of these routes are now well-documented on a West African scale, particularly with
regard to agricultural products, manufactured goods and fuel (Grégoire and Labazée 1993; Igué
1995; Enda Diapol 2007). They illustrate the fact that the mastery of mobility in the Sahel is
achieved by an ability to master the system of places and show that the profitability of trade
has led to inter-state collaboration against fraud being subordinated to the maintenance of
interpersonal relationships between merchants and officials.
In the region of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba, for example, this operation affects the trade in
cereals, fuel and textiles, which represent a significant proportion of the products that are likely to
cross borders. Exports of maize, millet and rice from Benin are therefore carried out using small
clandestine ports located on the River Niger that make it possible to keep road transport costs
down and bypass the customs services and border authorities on a seasonal basis. If the Republic
of Niger suffers a cereal shortage, these networks allow agricultural products to be transported
to Niamey, the capital of Niger, in three days by motor canoe; if the situation in Niger then
improves, particularly after the harvests, products will be directed to the river port of Gaya to be
sold locally.
Although this type of trade is of considerable importance from the point of view of food security,
it is a long way from generating profits that are as large as those seen in petroleum. The proximity
of Nigeria and Benin by river or land routes encourages the development of a vast contraband
network from the Nigerian towns located downstream of Gaya. A river brigade is responsible for
intercepting traffickers transporting fuel in canoes from Nigeria but its work is hindered by the
multiplicity of networks and an evident lack of resources.
The trade in second-hand clothes provides another particularly representative example of border
flows, essentially intended for reexport on an international scale and having developed following
the import restrictions decreed by Nigeria. These flows are based on the business relationships that
link certain owners of large warehouses in Gaya and Malanville to other Nigerian importers who
wish to transport significant stocks of clothes from the United States and Western Europe into their
country. By exploiting the effectiveness of their networks at crossing the borders, the lack of cross-
border cooperation by governments and obvious complicity on the part of officials, these traders
now manage to supply the big Sahelian markets with imported textiles. This means that, in fifteen
years, the little town of Gaya has become one of the main hubs for second-hand clothes for the
whole of West Africa. As it is located 700 km from Cotonou, Gaya is actually the nearest market in
Niger to the Gulf of Guinea, which makes it possible to transport textiles without paying customs
duties through Benin. Thanks to this privileged situation, merchants can freely import textiles and
negotiate their sale to Nigerian traders who will reexport them into their country and, to a lesser
extent, into Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Burkina Faso. This trade is dominated by around twenty
major operators from Niger - Fula, Zarma, Hausa and Songhai people, by the Igbo people of
Nigeria and by a small number of Tunisian and Libyan traders, some of whom left Cotonou, Lomé
or Ouagadougou in order to set up in Gaya and thus take advantage of the dynamism linked to the
second-hand clothes market.
The moving centrality of border markets
The example of Gaya and Malanville might suggest that the historical development of the urban
border markets in the Sahel is linear in nature. Although these two markets display all the

Journal of Borderlands Studies | 24.1 - 2009
41
characteristics of an area in the process of integration from an economic point of view, the fact
remains that other trading centres may develop differently.
Such is the case, in particular, of the nearby market of Kamba in Nigeria, which for a long time
was one of the main supply points of this “triple point” on the Niger-Benin-Nigeria border and
which has suffered a very sharp decline over the last twenty years. Until the end of the 1980s,
however, Kamba was a market visited by foreign customers who procured fuel, manufactured
goods and agricultural products there.
According to Walther (2007), there are various reasons for the decline of the Nigerian town. In the
first place, the fall in business can be explained by an increase in checks, customs seizures and the
rotation of local surveillance officers put in place by Nigeria with the objective of curbing corrup-
tion and consecutively restricting the significant level of imports that could damage its national
industry. As well as these effects, there was a state of insecurity, marked by armed attacks that had
an irregular impact on the town’s market and bus station and which restricted movements by trad-
ers likely to carry out cross-border business.
In the second place, the dynamism of the Nigerian town was also influenced very strongly by
structural shortages and instances of sabotages suffered by Nigerian pipelines and refineries,
which obviously did not favour supply to the north-west of the country. Added to this is the fact
that the Nigerian government set itself the goal of increasing petroleum product prices during the
1990s, to avoid continuing to subsidise consumer prices on a massive scale, which greatly reduced
Kamba’s appeal for the residents of Niger and Benin.
In the third place, the implementation of Sharia law in the northern Nigerian states with effect
from the early 2000s led to clashes that had a negative effect on economic activity. The Christian
Yoruba and Igbo traders who had been established in Kamba since the 1930s left the town and
made their way to Gaya and Malanville, or even further, to Ouagadougou and Niamey. The de-
parture of these traders, who specialised in selling manufactured goods (plastics, machinery, hard-
ware and spare parts) from the large cities in southern Nigeria precipitated the town’s economic
decline. When they left Kamba, their expertise with regard to supply networks was not replaced
by local skills. This shows the crucial importance of the presence of the large traders of market
capitalism, known as patrons in the (French) everyday language of West Africa.
Clientelism of patrons
The context of economic activity is highly dependent on the specific ambitions and qualifications
of the economic players who drive the markets, speculate on agricultural surpluses and short-
ages and build up international networks. As Baier (1980) pointed out more than 25 years go, the
particular elite of the patrons provides a good way into understanding market clientelism in West
Africa. These patrons are distinct from both the African “Big Men” motivated by capturing an
electorate and studied by Médard (1992), and the development brokers, analysed by Bierschenk,
Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan (2000), who drive social networks and manage strategic contacts.
In the border areas, the presence of this elite is particularly pronounced.
The resources released by market capitalism enable ostentatious patronage to be maintained,
something that is particularly well-developed in the urban context as demonstrated by the large
number of projects financed by wealthy businessmen in Sahelian towns (Grégoire 1986). In Gaya
and Malanville for example, this patronage is seen primarily in the construction of mosques, the
imposing size and Saudi-inspired style of which generally break away from the traditional urban
fabric. The construction of a mosque is a personal act, the purpose of which is a form of divine
recognition. It embodies success and brings higher social added value than non-religious civil
investments, which suffer from the fact that the concept of “public good” has little meaning in the
Sahelian context.

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42
The presence of patrons in the border market towns is also characterised, as in Gaya, by forums
which can function as electoral intermediaries, by merging into the regional office headquarters of
the political parties. Rather surprisingly, the information distributed through this channel seems
to reach the most remote places with ease thanks to a dense network of clients.
These urban forums resemble the courts of earlier times in their form, but above all respond to
contemporary requirements in the context of democratisation. The patrons use them to establish
their legitimacy and spread ideas which will be able to serve any political interests that they might
have.
The action of patrons is certainly not limited to this local scale. In this connection, it must be
noted that in West Africa patrons do not form a modernistic “class” whose action would make
it possible to change production relationships, against traditional landowners and the military
(Boone 1994). On the contrary, the influence of merchants generally adapts to changes in society,
as is shown by the history of the great Sahelian empires founded on income from war and slavery
as well as clientelist relations of the Hausa states of the 17th century (Laya 1992). The colonial and
post-colonial eras continued to reinforce these trends by basing economic income on comparative
advantages in agriculture or mining and by giving increasing importance to structural adjustments
and the opening up of markets. In this movement, the economic elites quickly adopt a new role,
characterised by increased investment in high political circles, as shown, for example, by the fact
that merchants are strongly represented in the National Assembly of Niger (Table 1). In 2005, for
example, about 40% of the deputies had a business occupation.
Table 1: National Assembly of Niger (2004-2009): occupation of the deputies (%)
Political parties Merchants Others Unknown
MNSD Nassara (Mouvement National
pour la Société de Développement)
26.7 57.8 15.6
PNDS Tarayya (Parti Nigérien pour
la Démocratie et le Socialisme)
56.5 39.1 4.3
CDS Rahama (Convention
Démocratique et Sociale)
38.9 44.4 16.7
Rassemblement des Démocrates 43.8 37.5 18.8
Mean 38.2 48.0 13.7
Note: The President of the National Assembly and the members of the Bureau are not included in
the analysis. The MNSD is the ruling party whereas the PNDS Tarayya is a “socialist” party. The
CDS Rahama is a “social-democrat” party and the Rassemblement des Démocrates is a coalition of
all the other parties in the country.
Source: Maman 2003 and author’s enquiries
The massive presence of traders in the state apparatus of Niger is a phenomenon that has
undergone an uneven evolution. From the late 1950s, traders formed an influential group
maintaining close relationships with the political class and, until 1966, private enterprise was
encouraged, with the state itself being the cause of the increased wealth of certain merchants
on a clientelist basis. In the 1970s, on the other hand, traders found it difficult to impose their
interests against the state elite, who suspected that they wanted to extend their influence into
rural populations (Amselle and Grégoire 1987). The objective of the one party regime of Seyni
Kountché in Niger (1974-1989), like that of the Marxism-Leninism of Mathieu Kérékou in Benin
(1972-1990), was to restrict the opportunities for merchants to obtain political favours.

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43
In 1974, when the army’s transport resources enabled a partial solution to food shortages and
ensured its popular success in Niger, the slogan “Non à l’affairisme des agents de l’Etat” (No to
profiteering by stage agents), for example, was coined to bind the country together around the
state apparatus. However, this optimism would be short-lived.
The subsistence crisis in the 1980s, which revealed the limits of the development programmes
based on the self-sufficiency of Sahelian production, then encouraged traders to invest in the polit-
ical sphere. During these years, which were also marked by structural adjustments, the patrons of
market capitalism were in fact the players on which the political elites were forced to rely in order
to guarantee people’s food security. The democratisation seen in the 1990s – known as décrispation
(easing of tension) in Niger – brought further changes by allowing traders to invest massively in
the National Assembly and creating an inextricable link between their financial resources and the
policies pursued by the political parties. Over a number of legislative terms, these traders took the
ascendancy and their status changed from that of operators suspected by the dictatorship of using
their speculative practices to exploit peasants to that of dominant players in the national political
system (Grégoire 1994).
The democratisation of the 1990s therefore corresponded to a certain social relaxation and an
easing of the procedures aimed at private undertakings as part of the structural adjustment pro-
grammes. While traders became actively engaged in politics, the privatisation of the most profit-
able public undertakings helped to increase the wealth of an elite that from then on was prone to
ostentatious behaviour. The austerity that characterised the military regime was therefore replaced
by a climate that was more favourable to patrons and also more inegalitarian as far as citizens were
concerned. The links that bind commerce and politics today have been furthered strengthened due
to increasingly tough competition for state resources and public contract allocation practices that
lack transparency.
Conclusion
In the Sahel, the borders that stemmed from colonisation still offer suitably fertile ground for in-
formal commerce to bloom. As suggested by the model adopted during this work, Sahelian uncer-
tainty is a structural given that cannot be solved locally, by assigning certain areas to certain forms
of production, but which can, on the other hand, be bypassed by the implementation of large
international supply networks based on the process of circulation. In this general plan, markets
such as the ones in Gaya, Malanville and Kamba represent special areas from which a certain type
of cross-border functional integration is constructed. This integration conducted on the border
usually results from a cash-generating negotiation between the patrons of market capitalism and
the porteurs de tenue (civil servants) responsible for state boundaries.
These elements suggest that the Sahel is an area in which the most mobile organisation is also the
safest and enable the construction of a geographical theory based on the primacy of circulation
over production. Therefore the border markets reveal spatial mobility because their border location
makes them very sensitive to changes in economic activity, which precipitates their rise or fall.
In this model, the organisation of traders is not built against the existence of boundaries and the
state, but rather stems from a clientelist use of the colonial partition of land. Indeed, the patrons
develop alliances that take them towards a certain convergence of interests with the ruling class
made up of state employees and the army.
So far these specificities seem to have had little influence on development practice. Very few de-
velopment programmes have been specifically dedicated to promote the circulatory dimension of
the economy and to develop the urban border areas that polarise flows. Two elements, however,
provide an incentive to reconsider the significance of patrons and border markets.
Firstly, the clientelist practices of Sahelian patrons are likely to interfere with the objectives of
participation pursued by the states and development agencies. Indeed, the operation of Sahelian
clientelism is far from leading to a fair redistribution of the gains made from commerce, with the

Journal of Borderlands Studies | 24.1 - 2009
44
market being dominated by a small number of operators who enjoy privileged relationships within
the states.
These patrons play the role of intermediaries in the general flow of relations that covers all the po-
litical, economic and social fields and they use their position to link into segments of power to ad-
dress their clients or their own patrons. In this type of configuration, the omnipresence of patrons
complicates the implementation of participative policies based on support for a civil society virtu-
ously placed between an ineffective state and a market that leads to inequalities. The emergence of
a base structured on the horizontal relationships between the state, civil society and the market is
thus contradicted by the clientelist structure of patrons and their clients.
Secondly, the creation of territorial structures able to frame the functional dynamism observed in
Sahelian Africa may be offset by the vested interests of patrons active across border regions. As a
matter of fact, the example of border crossroads suggests that Sahelian patrons are the agents of
their own economy, rather than State or firm representatives grounded into production territories.
Such actors’ interests therefore rest on a circumstantial and patronage-driven usage of the frontier,
opposed to any form of institutionalization. As suggested by Bach (2008), the economic profit
of these actors hinges on their ability to shun State control or to subvert their formal function-
ing through patronage, which resists any harmonization a regional, cross-border cooperation
might effect.
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Endnotes
1 This paper represents a synthesis of theoretical and empirical work the author embarked upon first as a
PhD student at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) from 2003 to 2006, then as a research officer
at the Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies in Luxembourg. The fieldwork was
based on an institutional collaboration between the Institute of Geography of the University of Lau-
sanne and the Department of Geography of the University of Niamey (Niger). The method combined
geographical and socio-economical analysis with fieldwork. Data were collected with the help of the
Nigerien Agency for the Promotion of Private Irrigation (ANPIP), a national programme funded by
the World Bank, the Ministry of Community Development (Niger) and the Nigerien Customs Ser-
vice. A survey was conducted on 47 villages and urban areas in the Gaya (Niger), Malanville (Benin)
and Kamba (Nigeria) local States in order to analyze the spatial organization of agricultural prod-
ucts, manufactured goods, second-hand clothes, used cars and fuel. Semi-structured interviews were
carried out face-to-face with 75 local patrons on the three markets of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba.
In addition to the economic operators, interviews were also extended to traditional leaders and some
urban notables, representatives of States (Prefecture, Customs) and communities (municipalities) (see
Walther 2008 for a more complete description of the methodology).
2 This paper is a first attempt at “crossing the border” and presents English-speaking readers with a brief
presentation of research dedicated to the so-called “mobile space” model that as yet is still available
only in French.
3 Access to reliable quantitative data is usually difficult in West Africa. Given the informal nature and
the flexibility of cross-border flows, an approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods was
adopted in this study. The process of cross-border integration was partially analyzed through national
statistics. Occasional surveys focusing on key products (textiles, cars, oil, agricultural products, etc.)
were also conducted. These data made it possible to carry out the geographical analysis of cross-border
integration (evaluation and mapping of flows, dynamic markets, effects of the border, etc.).