In this essay, I explain how Hare's criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium and his acceptance of the meaning/application distinction result from his acceptance of the analytic/synthetic distinction and draw from this specific discussion more general conclusions regarding the implications of accepting or rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction for the use of moral judgments in moral theory justification. I conclude that an acceptance of the distinction precludes the use of moral judgments, while its rejection leaves open the possibility that they could be used, if the issue of their epistemic status can be successfully resolved. (edited)
CITATION STYLE
McCrickerd, J. (2001). Moral Judgments and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research, 26, 423–433. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2001_9
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