The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the alternative is less than a threshold, it gets eliminated from the game. A special subclass of repeated games that always stop after a finite number of stages is considered. Threshold updating rule is proposed. A computer simulation is used to illustrate two properties of these voting games.
CITATION STYLE
Malafeyev, O. A., Rylow, D., Zaitseva, I., Ermakova, A., & Shlaev, D. (2018). Multistage voting model with alternative elimination. In AIP Conference Proceedings (Vol. 1978). American Institute of Physics Inc. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5043756
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