The purpose of this note is to tidy up some matters concerning ascriptions of intention and the employment of the doctrine of double effect (henceforth DDE). I first argue that Jonathan Bennett's efforts to show that DDE is a foolish doctrine are unsatisfactory. I then consider a puzzle of Mark Johnston's that seems to pose a problem for the defender of DDE. I turn to possible solutions to the puzzle, criticize one, and then offer the one I find most appealing. I then show how my proposal for employing DDE enables it to make some distinctions between courses of conduct without issuing foolish pronouncements about moral permissibility. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Delaney, N. F. (2007). A note on intention and the doctrine of double effect. Philosophical Studies, 134(2), 103–110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9086-z
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