Abstract
By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security and trustworthiness of the overall system. We discuss two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and cost-subsidies (pay for effort). © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
Author supplied keywords
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Grossklags, J., Radosavac, S., Cárdenas, A. A., & Chuang, J. (2010). Nudge: Intermediaries’ role in interdependent network security. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6101 LNCS, pp. 323–336). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13869-0_24
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
