An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism

  • De Marneffe P
ISSN: 0031-8116
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Abstract

This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as a theory of what is intrinsically good for us because it implies that nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does not have the psychological capacity for the propositional attitude of enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacities that humans have.

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APA

De Marneffe, P. (2003). An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 115(2), 197.

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