Psychological Review
Vol. 60, No. 3, 19S3
OBSERVATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF EMOTION
WILSON McTEER
Wayne University
In the theoretical discussion of the
topic of perception, psychologists for
generations have emphasized that the
perceived object is a function of the
observer's "set to perceive." Strangely,
this same relationship is often over-
looked when investigators come into
disagreement in denning perceptual ob-
jects in other areas of psychological
investigation. While it is generally
realized that in any research one in-
vestigator can observe only a portion
of the many potentially observable se-
quences which are occurring, it is too
frequently assumed that because one
observer reports on an event of a named
category, then another investigator un-
der similar objective circumstances can
and will observe the same sequence of
events (if his interest is directed to-
ward that same category). If the sec-
ond investigator does not verify the
observations of his predecessor, all too
frequently charges and countercharges
are exchanged with regard to (a) the
objective circumstances (experimental
situation) or with regard to (b) the
fallibility of the observer; rarely is
there an attempt made to cross-check
the (c) observational set of the two
investigators.
In general, such clashes occur with
least frequency in those areas in which
precise description of experimental situ-
ation and apparatus narrows the range
of set variability to almost zero, as in
the study of sensation or of the condi-
tioned reflex. On the other hand, such
disagreements occur with regularity in
those areas which are concerned with
the study of human behavior in molar
situations, that is, in those areas in
which set variability permits a wide
range of differential selection of signifi-
cant events out of the composite ob-
served (emotion, motivation, personal-
ity, social adjustment, as examples).
The writer has been interested for
some years in the controversies concern-
ing the concept of emotion. In this
area in particular, "set to perceive" is
clearly responsible for much of the di-
versity of factual and theoretical ob-
servations. Even though P. T. Young
in his Emotion in Man and Animal
(24) gave one of the most inclusive
definitions of this term which has yet
been written, he creates confusion in
that he strives to include in a single
observational description three fun-
damentally different perceptual view-
points. Likewise, D. O. Hebb in his
article "Emotion in Man and Animal:
An Analysis of the Intuitive Processes
of Recognition" (11), gives a striking
example of the manner in which dif-
ferent perceptual sets produce data of
unlike utility in studying emotional be-
havior in the chimpanzee. In this arti-
cle he reported that in the Yale Lab-
oratory of Primate Biology in Florida a
. . . thoroughgoing attempt to avoid an-
thropomorphic description in the study of
temperament was made over a two-year pe-
riod. . . . A formal experiment was set up
to provide records of the actual behavior of
the adult chimpanzees, and from these rec-
ords to get an objective statement of the
differences from animal to animal. All
that resulted was an almost endless series
of specific acts in which no order or mean-
ing could be found. On the other hand,
by the use of frankly anthropomorphic
concepts of emotion and attitude one could
quickly and easily describe the peculiarities
of the individual animals (11, p. 88).
172

OBSERVATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF EMOTION 173
This latter type of description, he as-
serted further, provided "an intelligible
and practical guide to behavior" of the
individual animals which was not found
in the description of the separate acts.
Considerably earlier, in the contrast-
ing summaries presented by Landis
(16) and Bard (1) in Murchison's The
Foundations of Experimental Psychol-
ogy (1929), it was evident that dif-
fering perceptual sets were producing
remarkably unlike data (yet not nec-
essarily conflicting, and all quite prop-
erly classified under the same general
topic of emotion). Later, this disparity
of data led to the series of articles by
Dashiell (6), Dunlap (10), Meyer
(19), and Duffy (8, 9) with the com-
mon theme that the term emotion no
longer had any proper use within the
frame of scientific psychology.
Nevertheless, it is the contention of
this paper that much of the seeming
confusion and controversy concerning
the concept of emotion would be re-
moved if the differing perceptual sets
of the contributors were recognized.
If the logic of the following schematic
analysis is adopted, there are only three
fundamentally different points of view
which are available for use in the
observation of emotional phenomena.
However, the simplicity of this analysis
is reduced when it is recognized that
within the frame of each of these points
of view there are possible significantly
different perceptual sets and, within
each of these sets, multiple levels of
description (microscopic to macro-
scopic) may further complicate the
observational report.
These three fundamental points of
FIG. 1. Schema illustrating observational viewpoints in the study of emotion. In the above
diagrams the large circle is intended to represent the extent of the effective stimulating environ-
ment impinging upon an emotional organism at any moment of observational study (obviousry
the cumulative effect of the stimulations of previous moments is not shown). The organism
which is being observed is indicated by the small circle within the larger one. The dominant
aspect of the immediate environment which is the focus of the organism's emotional attack or
withdrawal is represented by an X. A second small circle with an arrow attached indicates
both the reporting observer and the direction of his observation.