On Analysing Knowledge
- ISSN: 00318116
Abstract
Since gettier showed that knowledge cannot be analysed as true justified belief, Many analyses of knowledge have been proposed, Almost all assuming that truth is an independent condition of the analysis. I argue that although knowing that p implies that p is true, That p is true cannot be an independent condition in the analysis. If, For example, One believes that both black and white are innocent, And satisfies all the other conditions of a proposed analysis with respect to (e.G., Has equally good evidence for) the innocence of each of them, But one of them is guilty, Then he does not know that either is innocent. If this is correct, Knowing that p requires being guaranteed of the truth of p, And we do not know most of what we are said to know. I suggest that 'know', Much like 'flat', Is an ideal term which is appropriately used in certain situations in which it does not literally apply.
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