Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1986, W. 51, No. 1,125-139
Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514y86/$00.75
On the Nature of Self-Monitoring: Matters of Assessment,
Matters of Validity
Mark Snyder and Steve Gangestad
University of Minnesota
An extensive network of empirical relations has been identified in research on the psychological
construct of self-monitoring. Nevertheless, in recent years some concerns have been expressed about
the instrument used for the assessment of self-monitoring propensities, the Self-Monitoring Scale.
Both the extent to which the measure taps an interpretable and meaningful causal variable and the
extent to which the self-monitoring construct provides an appropriate theoretical understanding of
this causal variable have been questioned. An examination of reanalyses of studies of self-monitor-
ing, analyses of the internal structure of the Self-Monitoring Scale, and further relevant data suggest
that the measure does tap a meaningful and interpretable causal variable with pervasive influences
on social behavior, a variable reflected as a general self-monitoring factor. We discuss the evaluation
and furthering of the interpretation of this latent causal variable, offer criteria for evaluating alterna-
tive measures of self-monitoring, and present a new, 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale.
According to theoretical analyses of self-monitoring, people
differ in the extent to which they can and do observe and control
their expressive behavior and self-presentation (e.g., Snyder,
1979). Individuals high in self-monitoring are thought to regu-
late their expressive self-presentation for the sake of desired
public appearances, and thus be highly responsive to social and
interpersonal cues of situationally appropriate performances.
Individuals low in self-monitoring are thought to lack either the
ability or the motivation to so regulate their expressive self-pre-
sentations. Their expressive behaviors, instead, are thought to
functionally reflect their own enduring and momentary inner
states, including their attitudes, traits, and feelings.
A number of hypotheses concerning, among others, the de-
terminants of specificity and consistency in social behavior, the
origins of linkages between attitudes and action, the dynamics
of social interaction, and the nature and consequences of con-
ceptions of self have followed from these basic initial proposi-
tions. Research involving a measure of self-monitoring propen-
sities (the Self-Monitoring Scale; for information on its reliabil-
ity and validity, see Snyder, 1974) has provided empirical
support for these and many more hypotheses about the cogni-
tive, behavioral, and interpersonal consequences of self-moni-
toring (e.g., Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982; Becherer & Richard,
1978; Caldwell& O’Reilly, 1982;Danheiser&Graziano, 1982;
Ickes, Layden, & Barnes, 1978; Krauss, Geller, & Olson, 1976;
Kulik&Taylor, 1981;Lippa, 1976, 1978;Lutsky, Woodworth,
The research for and the preparation of this article were supported
in part by National Science Foundation Grant BNS 82-07632 to Mark
Snyder, in part by a National Institute of Mental Health National Re-
search Council postdoctoral traineeship to Steve Gangestad, and in part
by a grant from the University of Minnesota Computer Center.
We thank Daryl Bern and Jeffry A. Simpson for their helpful com-
ments on the article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mark
Snyder or to Steve Gangestad, Department of Psychology, University of
Minnesota, 75 East River Road, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455.
& Clayton, 1980; McCann & Hancock, 1983; Paulhus, 1982;
Rarick, Soldow, & Geizer, 1976; Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher,
1981; Shaffer, Smith, & Tomarelli, 1982; Snyder, 1974; Snyder,
Berscheid, & Click, 1985; Snyder & Cantor, 1980; Snyder &
Gangestad, 1982; Snyder, Gangestad, & Simpson, 1983; Snyder
&Kendzierski, 1982a, 1982b; Snyder &Monson, 1975;Snyder
& Simpson, 1984; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Snyder & Tanke,
1976; Tunnell, 1980; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980).
More recently, elaboration of the construct has led to its ap-
plication in yet other domains of social behavior and interper-
sonal relationships. Some of the domains in which the Self-
Monitoring Scale has proven its relevance and applicability are
recent and ongoing explorations of the nature of friendships
(e.g., Snyder & Smith, 1986), romantic relationships (e.g., Sny-
der & Simpson, 1986), and sexual involvements (e.g., Snyder,
Simpson, & Gangestad, 1986), as well as applications to the
psychology of advertising (e.g., Snyder & DeBono, 1985), per-
sonnel selection (e.g., Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk, 1984),
and psychopathology (e.g., Snyder & Smith, 1985).
Clearly then, over many years of research, a large number of
associations between the Self-Monitoring Scale and a wide
range of important behavioral criteria have been documented;
for reviews of these associations, see Snyder (1979, in press) and
Shaw and Costanzo (1982). In a phrase, the measure empiri-
cally works. This fact notwithstanding, in recent years some
concerns have been expressed about why and how the measure
works. Thus, Briggs and Cheek (1986) have stated,
The Self-Monitoring Scale is a popular measure of personality and
has served as the centerpiece for a number of published articles.
The scale has proved successful in predicting a variety of criteria
and has acted to stimulate experimental social psychologists’ inter-
est in the measurement of individual differences. The problem is
to understand why the scale works, (p. 129)
Of course, one may ask, isn’t the obvious answer that the Self-
Monitoring Scale works because it measures the differences be-
tween individuals explicated by the self-monitoring construct?
Or, if it doesn’t measure the self-monitoring construct, doesn’t
125

126 MARK SNYDER AND STEVE GANGESTAD
the scale work at least because it measures meaningful and sys-
tematic individual differences implicated in social behavior and
interaction? Although these may appear to be the obvious an-
swers, they are, according to Briggs and Cheek as well as others
(e.g., Lennox & Wolfe, 1984), wrong. For, according to these
authors, the Self-Monitoring Scale possesses psychometric
properties that pose threats to its ability to measure meaningful
and interpretable individual differences.
The Self-Monitoring Scale: What Does It Measure?
Specifically, what are the concerns that have been expressed
about the measure of self-monitoring? First, it has been claimed
that the Self-Monitoring Scale, whatever it measures, does not
validly measure the self-monitoring construct. The tenor of this
claim has ranged from the merely suggestive to the unshakably
resolute. Thus, Briggs, Cheek, and Buss (1980) have suggested
that there "may be a gap between the construct of self-monitor-
ing and its operationalization in the Self-Monitoring Scale" (p.
586). And, Lennox and Wolfe (1984) have asserted that the
"measure demonstrably lacks fidelity to the construct [of self-
monitoring]" (p. 1350).
Second, it has been claimed that the Self-Monitoring Scale
not only does not measure the construct of self-monitoring, but
also may not be a good measure of anything at all at least
anything that is interpretable or meaningful. Thus, Briggs et al.
(1980) have suggested, for instance, that "subjects labeled high
self-monitors in one study might be different from those labeled
high self-monitors in another study" (p. 684). And, Lennox and
Wolfe (1984) have stated, in no uncertain terms, that "the total
score on [the] scale tends to defy interpretation; it is impossible
to determine what the scale as a whole might be measuring" (p.
1350), and that the "measure . . . exhibits fundamental psy-
chometric weaknesses" (p. 1350).
It may seem that any measure that not only fails to tap the
latent construct that it is intended to tap, but also fails to tap
anything else, should be a rather worthless tool for purposes of
doing research to find associations with important aspects of
social behavior. But, as we have noted, a very large number of
associations have been found to exist between the Self-Monitor-
ing Scale and behavioral criterion variables. If the measure has
"fundamental psychometric weaknesses," why and how does it
work as well as it does? Those who have raised concerns about
the psychometric soundness of the measure have provided one
answer to this question. They claim that the measure has associ-
ations in the wide-ranging domains that it does because, in fact,
it measures not one person variable but, rather, multiple person
variables (e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1986). As a result, it is claimed,
the measure has associations with behavioral criterion variables
related to each of the multiple aspects of social behavior that
the Self-Monitoring Scale taps (none of which, incidentally, can
be identified as self-monitoring). Thus, they claim, the number
and range of effects the Self-Monitoring Scale achieves are
achieved illicitly.
What are we to make of these concerns expressed about the
Self-Monitoring Scale? Does the measure have fundamental
psychometric weaknesses? Does the measure achieve its effects
illicitly by tapping not a single entity but rather multiple aspects
of individual differences simultaneously? In the present article,
we address these questions about the Self-Monitoring Scale. Al-
though we explicitly deal with specific issues about the Self-
Monitoring Scale, we will implicitly speak also to general con-
cerns in the development and use of measures of individual
differences in building psychological theory. It is our hope that
discussion of issues surrounding the Self-Monitoring Scale will
contribute meaningfully to understanding fundamental issues
in personality.
Factor Analytic Investigations and Their Implications
Lennox and Wolfe (1984) claimed that if the Self-Monitoring
Scale measures something, this something is uninterpretable
(and thus presumably unmeaningful) due to "fundamental psy-
chometric weaknesses" (p. 1350). What are these purported
fundamental psychometric weaknesses? How would they
render total scores on the measure uninterpretable and un-
meaningful? The major claims about psychometric weaknesses
of the Self-Monitoring Scale have been based on interpretations
of factor-analytic investigations. It is now well established that
factor analysis of the Self-Monitoring Scale yields multiple
factors generally three (e.g., Briggs et al., 1980), although as
few as two (Sparacino et al., 1983) and as many as four (Ga-
brenya & Arkin, 1980) have been reported. Our own scree test
(Cattell, 1966) of the eigenvalues on a large college sample (N =
1918) clearly suggested three reliable factors (Gangestad & Sny-
der, 1985b).
Rotated factor structures of three factor solutions (e.g.,
Briggs et al., 1980) have reliably identified three item-content
clusters. A first cluster (which we call expressive self-control)
concerns the ability to actively control expressive behavior, for
example, "I would probably make a good actor" (keyed true)
and "I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight
face (if for a right end)" (true). A second cluster (social stage
presence) concerns the propensity to perform in social situa-
tions and attract social attention to oneself, for example, "In a
group of people I am rarely the center of attention" (false) and
"At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going" (false).
A third cluster (other-directed self-presentation) concerns dis-
playing what others expect one to display in social situations,
for example, "I may deceive people by being friendly when I
really dislike them" (true) and "I guess I put on a show to im-
press or entertain people" (true).
How might factor-analytic studies indicate psychometric
weaknesses that threaten the coherence and meaningfulness of
the Self-Monitoring Scale? Briggs and Cheek (1986) have pro-
vided the clearest statement of the concerns that follow from
factor-analytic studies (although similar concerns are at least
implicit in Briggs et al., 1980; Cheek & Briggs, 1981; and Len-
nox & Wolfe, 1984). A single scale, Briggs and Cheek (1986)
asserted, should measure a single individual difference or per-
son variable. Quoting McNemar (1946): "Measurement im-
plies that one characteristic at a time is being quantified" (p.
268). The fact that factor-analytic investigations find that multi-
ple person variables account for the interrelations between self-
monitoring items, Briggs and Cheek claim, raises the strong
possibility that the items do not measure a single person vari-
able.
What are the problems that follow from use of a measure that
does not tap a single person variable? First, the total scores are
rendered uninterpretable (Briggs et al., 1980; Lennox & Wolfe,