Developmental Psychology
1990, Vol. 26, No. 6, 978-986
Copyright 1990 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0012-1649/90/$00.75
Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and Self-Regulatory Competencies From
Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying Diagnostic Conditions
Yuichi Shoda and Walter Mischel
Columbia University
Philip K. Peake
Smith College
Variations of the self-imposed delay-of-gratification situation in preschool were compared to deter-
mine when individual differences in this situation may predict aspects of cognitive and self-regula-
tory competence and coping in adolescence. Preschool children from a university community
participated in experiments that varied features of the self-imposed delay situation. Experimental
analyses of the cognitive-attentional processes that affect waiting in this situation helped identify
conditions in which delay behavior would be most likely to reflect relevant cognitive and atten-
tional competencies. As hypothesized, in those conditions, coherent patterns of statistically signifi-
cant correlations were found between seconds of delay time in such conditions in preschool and
cognitive and academic competence and ability to cope with frustration and stress in adolescence.
To be able to delay immediate satisfaction for the sake of
future consequences has long been considered an essential
achievement of human development. After a series of investiga-
tions into the individual differences associated with the choice
to delay gratification (e.g., Klineberg, 1968; Mischel, 1958,
1961a, 1961b, 1966; Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Schack & Mas-
sari, 1973; Walls & Smith, 1970), research turned to the pro-
cesses underlying the ability to sustain self-imposed delay of
gratification after the initial choice has been made (e.g, Mis-
chel, 1974,1981; Toner & Smith, 1977). In a recent follow-up
study, preschool children who delayed gratification longer in
the self-imposed delay paradigm (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, &
Zeiss, 1972) were described more than 10 years later by their
parents as adolescents who were significantly more competent
(Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988). Specifically, when these chil-
dren became adolescents, their parents rated them as more aca-
demically and socially competent, verbally fluent, rational, at-
tentive, planful, and able to deal well with frustration and
stress. The study suggested that long-term prediction may be
Preparation of this article and the research were supported in part
by Grants MH45994 and MH39349 to Walter Mischel from the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health.
We are grateful to Antonette Zeiss for her role in facilitating the
follow-up mailing for this study and in compiling and preparing the
experimental data for computer analysis; without her generous help,
this research would have been much more difficult to conduct. We
would also like to acknowledge the essential contributions of the
former students of Walter Mischel, who were crucial in conducting the
original experiments in which children’s preschool delay time was as-
sessed. Finally, we thank the children, parents, and staff of the Bing
School, who were both subjects and friends. Without all of these partic-
ipants, this longitudinal study would not have been possible.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Yui-
chi Shoda or Walter Mischel, Department of Psychology, Columbia
University, New York, New York 10027.
possible from the self-imposed delay paradigm, adding to a
growing tradition of research devoted to the identification of
stability and coherence throughout development (e.g., Block,
1971; Caspi, Elder, & Bern, 1987; Erickson, Sroufe, & Egeland,
1985; Kagan & Moss, 1962). However, the small sample size
required combining the different experimental situations in
which delay behavior was measured. Therefore, it was not possi-
ble to compare major variations of the self-imposed delay situa-
tion to examine the characteristics that might render it more or
less predictive of the obtained long-term outcomes. The present
study is an effort to overcome this constraint.
In the present study, we attempted to identify the particular
psychological conditions in which children’s delay of gratifica-
tion behavior is more likely to predict relevant individual dif-
ferences in developmental outcomes. The identification of
these conditions, which may be considered "diagnostic" (Quat-
trone & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Hutchinson, 1986), is derived
directly from the theoretical and experimental analyses of the
cognitive-attentional processes that enable the young child to
delay (e.g, Mischel, 1974,1981,1984). For this reason, we sup-
plemented the original follow-up sample with a second, larger
wave of outcome data collected about 3 years later, and thereby
almost doubled the available number of respondents. The new
follow-up wave also added expanded rating measures of both
cognitive and coping competence, as well as Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT) scores. These new data allowed us to compare
long-term correlates of delay behavior in the major variations of
the Mischel et al. (1972) self-imposed delay situations.
An important variation in the original preschool delay situa-
tions was whether or not the reward objects were more salient
(i.e, exposed vs. obscured) during the delay period. In an exten-
sive series of experiments (Mischel, 1974,1981) to clarify the
basic processes allowing young children to delay gratification,
it was found that for children at this age (about 4.5 years old),
physically exposing the rewards appears to increase the ten-
dency to have arousing, consumatory thoughts about them.
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DELAY OF GRATIFICATION 979
This tendency could be overcome, however, when children
used effective cognitive strategies during the delay period, for
example, by distracting themselves from the arousing qualities
of the rewards or by transforming them cognitively (e.g, Mis-
chel & Baker, 1975; Mischel & Moore, 1980). Furthermore, al-
though these strategies were suggested as manipulations in the
experiments, they also seemed to be used spontaneously by
children who delayed longer.
Thus, when the rewards were exposed, preschoolers tended
to wait longer when they were given effective strategies, or when
they generated their own, for reducing the arousal while sus-
taining their goal-directed delay. Such strategies seemed to in-
volve "a combination of avoiding excessive frustration by not
focusing on the actual rewards or by transforming them to min-
imize motivational arousal, and attending instead to the sym-
bolic representation of the outcomes" (Mischel, 1974, p. 288).
Therefore, when preschoolers were not given these strategies,
their behavior in the exposed-rewards situation should have
more readily reflected any naturally occurring individual dif-
ferences in their spontaneous use of such strategies. To the de-
gree that individual differences in the child’s ability to generate
effective cognitive-attentional strategies to cope with delay of
gratification are enduring and have consequences for facilitat-
ing adaptation, we expected children’s preschool delay time
measured with the rewards exposed to predict later outcomes
and indices of cognitive and social competence relevant to this
ability. On the basis of the experimental analysis and the results
from the first follow-up, we expected these outcomes to include
such qualities as attentional-cognitive resourcefulness and flex-
ibility and, more generally, academic competencies, as well as
more effective, mature coping with frustration and stress (see
Mischel et al, 1988).
In comparison with the exposed-rewards condition, when
the rewards were obscured, no special strategies seemed to be
required for preschoolers to delay (e.g, Mischel, 1974). For ex-
ample, instructions to "think fun" and to self-distract did not
significantly increase delay time when the rewards were already
obscured, indicating that children in this condition were able to
spontaneously wait without such help (Mischel et al, 1972). We
therefore reasoned that children’s delay behavior in this situa-
tion would be less related to their ability to generate effective
strategies for coping with the conflict because the situation did
not demand such ability. Observed variance in delay behavior,
which was still substantial, might then reflect specific motiva-
tional or other situational considerations (e.g, how much they
wanted the particular objects) rather than their ability to gener-
ate strategies for sustaining self-imposed delay. This expectation
is consistent with the view that individual differences in strate-
gies for coping with frustration or stress may be especially visi-
ble in situations that strain the coping competencies of the
individuals in them (Wright & Mischel, 1987). It is also consis-
tent with a research strategy that has begun to show consider-
able value in attachment research: Early behavioral antecedents
seem more predictive when they are assessed in situations that
tax the coping skills of the individual (Ainsworth, 1979; Waters
& Sroufe, 1983).
So far, we have considered the diagnosticity of delay behavior
when children had to rely on their own coping strategies. The
available data also include conditions in which various strate-
gies and self-instructions had been suggested to the children to
use during the waiting period (e.g, Mischel & Baker, 1975). In
those conditions, children’s behavior reflected not just their
own spontaneous coping with delay but also their reactions to
the suggested strategies strategies that sometimes were help-
ful for delay but that sometimes made delay more difficult. For
example, when the experimenter suggested an effective strategy
(e.g, to self-distract by "thinking fun" while waiting, as in Mis-
chel et al, 1972), children who followed the instruction should
have been able to wait even if they had not spontaneously dis-
tracted themselves. In contrast, when poor strategies (e.g, to
think about rewards) were suggested, children were exposed to
a potentially confusing set of strategies (e.g, following the exper-
imenter-suggested strategies vs. those they spontaneously
thought would be helpful, such as self-distraction). Thus, their
delay time should be less clearly reflective of the ability to gener-
ate effective strategies. However, complex and unpredictable
interactions may occur between the children’s own spontaneous
delay strategies and the particular type of strategies suggested
to them, making it difficult to predict the potential meaning of
the child’s delay behavior in those conditions. Our theoretical
predictions of greater diagnosticity therefore focused primarily
on comparisons between conditions in which the rewards were
exposed versus obscured, with no ideation suggested to the
children (i.e, their strategies were entirely spontaneous). For the
sake of completeness, however, the data for conditions in which
strategies were suggested will also be presented.
Method
Overview
Preschool children’s delay of gratification behavior was assessed
during a period of approximately 6 years (1968-1974) in a series of
experiments conducted at the Bing School at Stanford University (e.g.,
Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, et al, 1972). In those studies, a
total of 653 children (316 boys, 337 girls) participated in at least one
experiment. About 10 years later (1981-1982), a short questionnaire
concerning the coping and cognitive competence of the children and
the California Child Q-set (CCQ) were mailed to the 125 parents
whose addresses could be located, yielding 95 respondents (see Mis-
chel et al, 1988). To expand the sample of respondents, a second follow-
up based on a more extensive address search was conducted in 1984. In
the second mailing, all parents were sent a new expanded question-
naire about coping and competence (the Adolescent Coping Question-
naire; ACQ) and a biographical information sheet on which they indi-
cated their children’s SAT scores. The CCQs were also sent to those
who either did not respond to the previous mailing or did not receive
the mailing because their addresses were not available at that time.
Materials were mailed to parents of 506 subjects. This yielded re-
sponses from parents of 90 subjects whose data were not available in
the first-wave follow-up, as well as additional data from the parents
who had responded in the first mailing. As a result, the sample for
which CCQ was available increased from 67 to 165, and we obtained
parental ratings on the new 14-item ACQ for 134 children, as well as
reports of 94 children’s SAT scores. Together with the first-wave mail-
ing, a sample of 185 children was now available on whom there was at
least one follow-up measure.1
1
Of the 653 original subjects, 103 were not tested in a standard self-
imposed delay situation and therefore were not used. Of the remaining
550, no address was known for 114, and follow-up materials were re-