In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is "epistemic" in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and "practical" in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of "inner epistemic virtue" to the "outer risks" implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories. © 2007 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
CITATION STYLE
Montmarquet, J. A. (2007). Pure versus “practical” epistemic justification. Metaphilosophy, 38(1), 71–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00468.x
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