Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know. On route I shall also argue that (i) the main necessitarian arguments do not converge on a single view, (ii) properties are transworld entities that cannot be handled by counterpart theory, and (iii) quiddistic skepticism is merely external world skepticism writ small. © Springer 2005.
CITATION STYLE
Schaffer, J. (2005). Quiddistic knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 123(1–2), 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5221-2
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