Reference, Truth and Realism

Abstract

John Searle sees previous philosophers as failing to distinguish between "intention-with-a-t" and "intension-with-an-s". This, he believes, leads them to mistake properties of reports for properties of things reported, in their discussions of intentionality, since reports may be "intensional" while what is reported is "extensional". Thus, speaking about John's belief that King Arthur killed Sir Lancelot, he says: "It is completely extensional: it is true if there is a unique x such that x = King Arthur and there is a unique y such that y = Sir Lancelot and x killed y. That is as extensional as anything can get." But all Searle means by the claim that "the belief", as opposed to "the report" of it, is completely extensional is that one gives the "truth condition" for "the belief", by giving the truth condition for the sentence King Arthur killed Sir Lancelot'. Put simply, the sentence King Arthur killed Sir Lancelot' does not raise the familiar issues about substitution raised by John believes that King Arthur killed Sir Lancelot'. While this is true, the analysis of intentional contexts that lies behind it fails to adequately take up, let alone resolve, the familiar logical and ontological problems of intentionality that Searle purports to solve.(edited)