Simple infeasibility certificates for attack trees

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Abstract

We introduce infeasibility certificates, compact and easily verifiable proofs that no profitable attacks exist in the considered system model. We introduce computational methods for generation and validation of such proofs using an enhanced weight reduction technique. A new method for obtaining adversarial expenses by approximating an interval within which this value resides, is an interesting approach to tackle NP-complete tasks and allows to obtain values that require extensive computations in reasonable time.

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APA

Buldas, A., Lenin, A., Willemson, J., & Charnamord, A. (2017). Simple infeasibility certificates for attack trees. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10418 LNCS, pp. 39–55). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64200-0_3

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