Tense and truth conditions

Abstract

The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart's A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory-originally put forth by J. J. C. Smart and later endorsed by by D. H. Mellor-the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has argued, the date-theory does not provide an adequate analysis of the ontological truth conditions of irreducible A-propositions. I show that the co-reporting theory-which holds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that differs in sense but reports the same event or state of affairs-escapes the objections Oaklander has addressed against the date-theory. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.