ol of emotion
n Hall, 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027, USA
tanford, CA 94305-2130, USA
tails with findings from other human and nonhuman
res
Marcus Aurelius (Meditations)
cognitive neuroscience models of the ‘cold’ control of
attention and memory (e.g. [8,9]). The aim of this review
is to evaluate recent imaging studies that, in the context of
evidence from allied human and animal work, help to
elucidate the functional architecture underlying the
cognitive control of emotion.
Emotion and emotion regulation
An essential part of understanding emotion regulatory
mechanisms is characterizing the processes that generate
emotions. Current models posit that emotions are
person’ ([70], p. 141), and generated an early classic study of
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.9 No.5 May 2005‘hot’ control of emotion draws on rapidly developingon emotion regulation has entered a new phase as
functional imaging studies of regulatory phenomena in
humans have developed rapidly. This growth has facili-
tated investigation of human analogs to affective beha-
viors studied in animals, but, perhaps more importantly,
has allowed study of the emotion regulatory power of
higher cognitive control processes that are difficult to
study in animal models. In so doing, current work on the
reappraisal showing that subjective and physiological responses
decreased when a film of a potentially upsetting surgical procedure
was viewed in analytical and detached terms [71]. The third
antecedent is the developmental study of self-regulation, which
had its roots in the study of socioemotional development. This work
showed that children could obtain a preferred but delayed reward by
thinking about available treats in abstract ways (e.g. putting a mental
‘picture-frame’ around a cookie) that decreased their immediate
impulse to eat them [72]. Contemporary research builds on this
foundation using both behavioral and neuroscience methods toand nonhuman primates [1,4–7]. In recent years, researchforms of affective learning and social behavior in rodents dynamic approach in the 1960s. This line of work has focused on the
management of situations that ‘tax or exceed the resources of theIntroduction
Conflicts, failures, and losses at times seem to conspire to
ruin us. Yet, as Marcus Aurelius observed nearly two
millennia ago, we humans have an extraordinary capacity
to regulate the emotions occasioned by such travails.
Importantly, these regulatory efforts largely determine
the impact such difficulties will have on our mental and
physical well-being [1–3]. Given its importance to adap-
tive functioning, it is not surprising that research on
emotion regulation has a long history (Box 1). Past work
has investigated the cellular responses to stress, the
behavioral consequences of adopting specific regulatory
strategies, and the neural systems involved in simpleearch on emotion.
If you are distressed by anything external, the pain
is not due to the thing itself, but to your estimate of
it; and this you have the power to revoke at any
moment.The cognitive contr
Kevin N. Ochsner
1
and James J. Gross
2
1
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, Schermerhor
2
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Building 420, S
The capacity to control emotion is important for human
adaptation. Questions about the neural bases of
emotion regulation have recently taken on new import-
ance, as functional imaging studies in humans have
permitted direct investigation of control strategies that
draw upon higher cognitive processes difficult to study
in nonhumans. Such studies have examined (1) control-
ling attention to, and (2) cognitively changing the
meaning of, emotionally evocative stimuli. These two
forms of emotion regulation depend upon interactions
between prefrontal and cingulate control systems and
cortical and subcortical emotion-generative systems.
Taken together, the results suggest a functional archi-
tecture for the cognitive control of emotion that dove-valenced responses to external stimuli and/or internal
mental representations that (i) involve changes across
multiple response systems (e.g. experiential, behavioral,
peripheral physiological [10]), (ii) are distinct from moods,
in that they often have identifiable objects or triggers,
(iii) can be either unlearned responses to stimuli with
intrinsic affective properties (e.g. an unconditioned
response to an aversive shock) or learned responses to
stimuli with acquired emotional value (e.g. a conditioned
response or stimulus–reward association), (iv) and can
involve multiple types of appraisal processes that assess
the significance of stimuli to current goals [11], that
(v) depend upon different neural systems [3,12,13].
Emotion regulation involves the initiation of new, or the
alteration of ongoing, emotional responses through the
Box 1. A brief history of psychological research on emotion
regulation
Study of the cognitive control of emotion has three major historical
antecedents within psychology [1]. The first antecedent is the
psychodynamic study of defense, which was initiated by Freud a
century ago. This line of work has examined the regulation of anxiety
and other negative emotions using clinical descriptions and
individual difference studies of so-called perceptual defenses
against processing negatively arousing stimuli, and specific
defenses such as repressive coping [68,69]. The second antecedent
is the stress and coping tradition that grew out of the psycho-describe when, how, and with what consequences individuals
regulate their emotions.
Corresponding author: Ochsner, K.N. (ochsner@psych.columbia.edu).
Available online 5 April 2005
www.sciencedirect.com 1364-6613/$ - see front matter Q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.03.010

the overlapping neural systems supporting attentional
control and cognitive change, as indicated by their
Box 2. From basic mechanisms to individual differences
Characterizing the nature and operating characteristics of basic
emotion regulatory mechanisms in healthy participants might help
to establish a normative model for explaining the successful
regulation of emotion. It might also lead to a greater under-
standing of individual differences, clinical conditions and lifespan
development, by describing them in terms of variation and change
in the function of a basic functional architecture for the cognitive
control of emotion.
Among healthy adults, there is considerable variability in the nature
and strength of emotional responses, and also in the capacity to
regulate them. Behavioral studies have begun to explore the
experiential and behavioral consequences of these differences [73],
and characteristic patterns of resting and/or emotional stimulus-
through reappraisal, which itself depends upon cognitively reexamin-
ing the meaning of emotional events.
Many forms of psychopathology revolve around failures to
adaptively regulate emotional responses, with consequences ranging
from personal distress to socially maladaptive and self-destructive
behaviors [2,3,5]. Resting and symptom provocation studies have
begun to identify abnormal patterns of neural response in psychiatric
illness [3,6,13] and substance abuse (e.g. [77]) that might be related to
emotion regulation failures. However, very few studies have examined
directly the neural mechanisms mediating successful or unsuccessful
regulation in clinical populations using methods like those described
in this review (see, however, [78]). Building knowledge of dysregula-
tory mechanisms from a basic model of effective regulation could
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.9 No.5 May 2005 243action of regulatory processes. Current work examines the
processes that individuals use to influence which emotions
they generate, when they do so, and how these emotions
are experienced or expressed [1]. Several schemes have
been proposed for organizing regulatory strategies
(e.g. [14]). One distinction suggested by Gross and
colleagues contrasts behavioral (e.g. suppressing expres-
sive behavior) and cognitive (e.g. attending to or inter-
preting emotion-eliciting situations in ways that limit
emotional responding) regulation. Behavioral regulation
of negative emotions might limit expressive action but
does not dampen unpleasant experience, worsensmemory,
and increases sympathetic nervous system activation. By
contrast, cognitive regulation neutralizes negative experi-
ence without impairing memory and might decrease
physiological arousal [15,16]. Individual differences in
emotional responsivity and/or cognitive control capacity
related neural activity in prefrontal and emotional appraisal systems
are now being associated with gender, personality, negative affectivity
[3,74] and regulatory ability. For example, Jackson et al. found that
greater left PFC electrical activity at rest predicted dampened
physiological reactivity to aversive stimuli, which might reflect
automatic regulatory processes [75], and Ray et al. [76] found that
the tendency to cognitively ruminate about emotional events pre-
dicted enhanced ability to increase or decrease amygdala responsesmight be related to both normal and pathological variation
in well-being and social behavior (Box 2).
Recent imaging work has investigated two types of
cognitive regulation, attentional control and cognitive
change, which are the focus of this review. Figure 1 uses a
hypothetical continuum to illustrate relationships
between regulatory strategies tapping these two types of
control. These strategies might differ in: (1) their targets –
Attentional control
Selective
inattention
to emotional
stimuli
[19—22,25]
Performing
distracting
secondary
task
[31—35]
Attention to and
judgement of
emotional vs.
non-emotional
stimulus attributes
[23,24,26—28]
Figure 1. Hypothetical continuum illustrating relationships among the forms of cognit
continuum represent the exclusive use of attentional control or cognitive change, respec
strategies for controlled emotion generation and regulation, respectively. Relevant citat
heuristic function, helping the reader to visualize relationships among control strategie
www.sciencedirect.complacement along the continuum; and (4) whether emotion
change is their explicit goal (‘I want to feel better!’), or
occurs as a by-product of pursuing some other learning or
judgment-related goal (e.g. ‘I want to learn which judg-
ment is correct’).
Attentional control
Attention is often referred to as the selective aspect of
information processing, enabling us to focus on goal-
relevant (e.g. our writing) and ignore goal-irrelevantimpacting different types of emotional appraisal processes
and associated neural systems [17,18]; (2) their effects –
serving to initiate (amplify) or block (diminish) perception
of our responses to stimuli; (3) their relative reliance on
elucidate the nature of these disorders and suggest avenues for
cognitive and pharmacological treatment.
Basic models of emotion regulation might also help to explain the
development of regulatory capacities across the lifespan. It is possible,
for example, that structural and functional changes in control and
appraisal systems underlie normal and abnormal emotional
responses in children [79], and the positivity of emotional experience
in older adults [80].(e.g. loudmusic next door) information. In general, studies
have indicated that behavioral and neural responses
to attended as compared with unattended stimuli
(or stimulus features) are either facilitated or inhibited,
respectively (e.g. [19]). When responses to attended and
unattended inputs do not differ, processing is considered to
be relatively automatic. In the context of emotion,
researchers have begun asking how paying less attention
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences
Cognitive change
Anticipatory/
expectancy-
driven
emotion
[37—40,42—46]
Top-down
appraisal
[17]
Reappraisal
[48—54]
Placebo
[55—57]
S-R
reversal/
extinction
[58—65]
ive control of emotion described in this review. The left and right anchors for the
tively, to modulate emotion perception and/or responses. Red and blue text denote
ions for each strategy are shown in brackets. This continuum is intended to serve a
s (see text).