A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity)

  • Bergmann M
  • Brower J
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Abstract

Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato---{}or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato\textquoteright{}s name in contemporary philosophy---{}the truths expressed by predications such as \textquotedblleft{}Socrates is wise\textquotedblright are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.1 This view is supposed to be general, applying to all predications, whether the subject of predication is a person, a planet, or a property.2 Despite the controversy surrounding the metaphysics of predication, many theistic philosophers---{}including the majority of contemporary analytic theists---{}regard Platonism as extremely attractive. At the same time, however, such philosophers are also commonly attracted to a form of traditional theism that has at its core the thesis that God is an absolutely independent..

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Bergmann, M., & Brower, J. (2023). A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity). In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (pp. 357–386). Oxford University PressOxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199290581.003.0012

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