The common assumption that the Transcendental Deduction aims to refute scepticism often leads interpreters to conclude that it fails and even that Kant is confused about what it is supposed to achieve. By examining what Kant himself says concerning the Deductions' relation to scepticism, this article seeks to determine what sort of scepticism he has in view and how he responds to it. It concludes that the Deduction aims neither to refute Cartesian, outer- world scepticism nor to refute Humean, empiricist scepticism, and it outlines an alternative conception of the Deduction's task, as one of reconciling apparently conflicting claims of reason.
CITATION STYLE
Engstrom, S. P. (Stephen P. (1994). The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32(3), 359–380. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1994.0069
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