Una perspectiva anti-realista sobre: lenguaje, pensamiento, logica e historia de la filosofia analitica (entrevista con Michael Dummett)

Abstract

Wittgenstein famously argued that meaning is use. Dummett's interpretation of this insight leads to a rejection of classical logic in favor of intuitionistic logic. The antirealism adopted therein eschews both Brouwer's solipsism and Frege's truth-conditional account of sense. Dummett argues that antirealists must accept the analytic/synthetic distinction and that antirealist semantics is verificationist in some important respects. Although the antirealist program is traditionally grounded on the methodological thesis according to which the analysis of language is prior to the analysis of thought, the realism vs antirealism debate is also about the content of propositional attitudes. Finally, justifications being objective, ethical antirealism may not be akin to either subjectivism or relativism.

Author-supplied keywords

Cite this document ^(BETA)